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Introduction 
 
The relationship between a firm‘s innovative behavior and performance is now a significant issue in 
corporate economics. Firms are individual entities that produce products, undertake business and conduct 
innovative research and development (R&D) to consolidate their future performance. Increasing product 
complexity and range mean that firms now need to acquire more technical knowledge. However, not all 
firms are innovative. Some firms have a strong and robust competitive advantage in their technological 
knowledge and performance, and are thus competitive leaders. In contrast, other firms have a limited 
technological advantage, frequently resulting in their market exit or bankruptcy.  
  Diversified firms can generate economies of scope by efficiently exploiting resource allocation across 
multiple businesses. However, some researchers point out that firm diversification can have downsides, 
ultimately resulting in diseconomies of scope. Japan has large diversified firms, and there is some 
question on how the diversification activity affects a firm‘s performance.  
  Japanese firms are known for having intense technological knowledge and performance, particularly in 
high-tech manufacturing industries. Japanese firms are frequently characterized by large, robust 
ownership structures in contrast with the situation in other countries. There has been some investigation 
of the structure of such Japanese manufacturing industries; however, there is a lack of empirical analysis. 
  Many researchers use technology patent data as an innovative measure; however, there is a discordance 
when researchers attempt to use patent data for the economic analyses of goods and services, or for 
analysis at an individual firm or industry level. To resolve this issue, there is a need to establish a 
concordance between the patent and goods technology category and the standard industrial classification 
services category. However, currently there is no concordance in Japanese industries. 
  This paper focuses on the relationship between a firm‘s innovative behavior and performance in 
Japanese manufacturing. The main purpose of this research is to empirically establish how a firm‘s 
innovative behavior affects its performance. I focus on three main areas in my examination of innovation 
in Japanese manufacturing industries.  
 
1. The effects of business diversification and technology diversification on performance  
The purpose of this study is to analyze how both business diversification and technology diversification 
affect firm performance in Japan‘s electronics industry. Diversification direction (vertical integration) is 
investigated to estimate its effects on profitability. Surveyed firms were selected using Japanese stock 
exchange data and patent application data were collected for individual firms to identify existing 
technological knowledge. An analysis of selected firms over a ten year period was completed using 
defined variables; moreover, a series of model scenarios were prepared and undertaken to test the study 
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hypotheses. Empirical results show that business diversification has negative effects on firm performance, 
the effect being particularly evident for non-manufacturing diversification. In contrast, the results reveal 
that technology diversification has positive effects on firm performance. This result strongly supports the 
importance of possessing technical diversity for firm performance. These findings contribute to a 
comprehensive understanding of diversification behavior. 
 
2. Ownership, learning and innovation 
This study considers organizational learning within governance groups in Japan‘s automotive industry. 
The main objective of this paper is to examine the existence of the spillover effect within the governance 
structure. Using data on firms‘ patent applications and financial status, I measure multiple spillover 
effects models to determine whether a member‘s level of technological knowledge is affected by that of 
other members within the governance group. My results show that the technological knowledge of other 
group members has a positive effect on a firm‘s knowledge growth and that technologically close 
knowledge has a greater positive effect than technologically distant knowledge. Furthermore, by 
comparing regression coefficients, the effect of a cooperative relationship with subsidiaries is greater than 
that with a subsidiaries‘ parent company. This explains why the Japanese automotive industry tends to form 
significant downstream organization governance alliances or associations (referred to in this paper as 
governance relationships) to accelerate technological performance. My results show that a governance 
relationship assists technology diffusion and that cooperation within the ownership relationship is an 
efficient structure to enrich organizational learning.  
 
3. Linking patent data with industrial data and Japanese industrial technology profiles 
This study had two primary objectives: to make a concordance between Japan Standard Industrial 
Classification (JSIC) and International Patent Classification (IPC) in Japanese manufacturing industries, 
and to measure the descriptive analyses of patenting behavior. The paper then describes the relevant 
technological competencies between the concordance and each firm‘s and each industry‘s attributes. 
Moreover, by examining the technological profiles, I produce a competency contribution matrix between 
each integrated technology field by my concordance, and by identified firms in each industry. Researchers 
can use patent data as an economic parameter by using this JSIC and IPC concordance. It is also a 
valuable tool to understand technology profiles, proximity and R&D activities among the industries. 
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  The first area focuses on the internal strategies of firms, particularly within economics. The second area 
examines the effect of the governance group, an effect outside of the firm‘s control. Area three considers the 
concordance between technology and industrial fields to identify linkages between industrial behavior and 
patenting activity in Japanese manufacturing industries. I use these areas to establish the impact of the 
technology activity of individual firms in Japanese manufacturing industries. Two sources were used to 
extract the relevant data: financial reports and patents data. This research thus measured several empirical 
analyses to explain the relationship between a firm‘s innovative behavior and its performance.  
  I hope that this study will contribute towards the understanding of the impact of firms‘ innovation on 
Japanese manufacturing industries.  
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1. The Effects of Business Diversification and Technology Diversification on 
Performance: Empirical analysis of the Japanese Electronic Equipment Industry  
 
1–1. Introduction 
The impact of a firm‘s diversification strategy on its economic performance is a significant issue in 
strategic management research. Chandler (1962) argued that diversification was the future of corporation 
growth. He maintained that expansion into other businesses necessitates the acquisition of knowhow and 
structures to attain efficiency. A number of subsequent studies examined the positive effects of a 
diversification strategy (Williamson, 1971; Teece, 1982; Grant et al., 1988; Robins and Wiersema, 1995; 
Tanriverdi and Venkatraman, 2005). Other studies insisted that diversity has a negative effect (Baysinger 
and Hoskisson, 1989; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Geringer et al., 2000; Fukui and Ushijima, 2007). The 
impact of diversification strategies on the economic performance of corporations is a significant issue for 
management economics. A number of subsequent studies have attempted to clarify this issue; however, 
questions remain as to why firms diversify and as to the effects of diversification. In reviewing earlier 
studies on diversification strategy, Montgomery (1994) observed different and inconsistent findings.  
Particularly in recent years, electronic equipment requires a range of complex technologies to combine 
its various technical parts. Increasingly sophisticated consumer demands and competition have placed 
pressure on the electronics industry to continually update their products. As more complex components 
are required the electronics industry needs to access more technologies. I thus conclude that Japan‘s 
electronics industry is an optimal one for examining the effects of diversification.  
To establish the effects of business diversification and technology diversification on firms this paper 
focuses on the Japanese electronics industry, including firms possessing significant technology knowledge 
and businesses acumen such as Sony, Sharp, Panasonic, and Toshiba. Large firms tend to diversify into 
different business and technology fields. Leading medium-size companies, also possessing high levels of 
technology and know-how, contribute to, and support, Japan‘s electronic equipment industry. Some small 
and medium companies are more specialized in products and knowledge than relatively larger companies. 
Japan‘s firms had to reconsider their business strategies subsequent to the 1990s depression. In general 
Japanese firms were too diversified before the collapse of the bubble economy. To cope with the 
depressed economy, firm managers had to reconstruct their diversified businesses. Miyajima and Inagaki 
(2003) showed that Japanese firms decreased business diversification activities after the mid-1990s. In 
contrast, while business diversification decreased technology diversification became widespread 
(Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998). The effects of business diversification and technology diversification 
should be examined to identify their differences.  
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I outline the relationships that diversity and profitability have on the economic strategies of the 
Japanese electronics industry. The main purpose of this research is to comprehensively analyze how both 
business and technology diversification affect firm performance. To examine the effect of diversification, 
I measure the results of both business and technology diversification using two indices: concentration and 
the number of diversifications. By estimating both business and technology diversification, this paper can 
describe the effects of and draw a comparison between the diversifications. I also consider how vertical 
integration affects profitability. By measuring business diversification, technology diversification, and the 
direction of diversity, this paper comprehensively explains how diversification activities affect firm 
performance. 
 
1–2. Theory and Hypotheses 
In the study of diversification strategy, the resource-based theory is essential to explaining why 
diversification generates economies of scope. Diversified firms can allocate resources between business 
sectors, thus making better decisions on resource allocation than undiversified firms. Williamson (1971) 
argued that internal transactions and efficient resource allocation generates firm profitability. From this I 
conclude that the flexibility of resource allocation enjoyed by diversified companies has a positive impact 
on profitability. Similarly, Grant et al. (1988) asserted that diversified firms can make better resource 
allocation decisions, bringing better performance. Robins and Wiersema (1995) constructed an empirical 
model based on a resource-based approach for multi-business firms. They observed that highly 
interrelated business portfolios had positive effects on firm performance. 
Efficient resource allocation can be accomplished if the corporation possesses sufficient, and related, 
common resources. When diversified, a firm shares common resources across multi-business sectors: the 
firm can attain economies of scope from cost savings. Diversifying into a knowledge-related business can 
lead to the exploitation of common resources across the businesses. Breschi et al. (2003) demonstrated 
that knowledge-relatedness is a major feature of a firm‘s technology innovation. Similarly, Tanriverdi and 
Venkatraman (2005) empirically showed that having related knowledge resources across business sectors 
improves firm performance. Moreover, transaction cost theory suggests that managers should consider 
alternatives when a firm is in a position to exploit its resources. Teece (1982) argued that firms diversify 
to avoid high transaction costs, particularly in markets with specialized assets. Silverman (1999) showed 
that transaction costs affect a firm‘s diversification decisions.  
The studies discussed above examined the positive effects of business diversification, showing that 
firms can generate economies of scope by efficiently exploiting resource allocation across multiple 
businesses. The resource-based theory approach illustrates the advantages of economies of scope to be 
gained by diversification strategies. This study examines a hypothesis that business diversification has a 
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positive effect on profitability. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Business diversification has a positive effect on firm performance. 
 
Firm diversification can also have negative effects. Diversified firms must undertake ongoing 
expenditure in each individual business unit. Hence, large diversified firms can have poor opportunities if 
firms do not invest enough specific assets. Diversified firms do not benefit from economies of scale when 
it comes to capital assets as they must undertake separate asset financing for each business unit: this can 
be considered a weakness. The increased requirements for specific capital assets have reduced the 
advantage of large diversified firms. Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989) indicated that diversification has a 
negative effect on a firm‘s R&D intensity. 
A number of studies focused on the relationship between diversification discount and firm value 
(Berger and Ofek, 1995; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Graham et al., 2002; Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Lee et al., 
2008). In investigating the effect of the diversification discount on performance, Grant et al. (1988) found 
that product diversity led to declining profitability when a firm encountered limits to complexity. 
Geringer et al. (2000) empirically showed that product diversity has weak effects on firm performance. 
Similarly, Gemba and Kodama (2001) indicated that a firm‘s profitability diminished as it diversified into 
unrelated fields. Fukui and Ushijima (2007) noted the negative relationship between business 
diversification and performance in large Japanese firms. 
Hence, I can conclude that the effects of business diversification on performance are not clear. While 
having a positive economies of scope impact, business diversification may also yield a negative effect on 
performance. Therefore, on the basis of the diseconomies of scope theory, this study also examines the 
hypothesis that business diversification decreases firm profitability. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Business diversification has a negative effect on firm performance. 
 
The increasing complexities in product technologies have led to a diversity of technical knowledge. 
The more complex the products a firm manufactures, the greater the variety of technology required. From 
a resource-based theory perspective, diversified firms can create economies of scope by exploiting 
technical knowledge across their businesses (Robins and Wiersema, 1995; Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998; 
Miller, 2006). Some researchers have pointed out the increasing importance of technology diversification 
over business diversification. Patel and Pavitt (1997), and Brusoni et al. (2001) showed that 
multi-technology firms need to have detailed technical knowledge levels on the items they produce. Pavitt 
(1998) argued that specialized technology understandings have impacts on the products made. 
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Gambardella and Torrisi (1998) showed that firms are tending towards reduced product diversity, but an 
increased technical base diversity. Piscitello (2004) showed technology-based coherence to be more 
prevalent than product-based coherence. 
Moreover, the combination of knowledge from different technical fields is an important technology 
opportunity resource. Gambardella and Torrisi (1998) showed that the accumulation of technology 
capability in different fields is essential to create complex products. Suzuki and Kodama (2004) found 
that technology diversity has contributed to product diversification and sales growth. They showed that 
taking advantage of technology economies of scope is necessary for a technology-based firm. 
Garcia-Vega (2006) and Miller (2006) maintained that a combination of knowledge was the source of 
technology opportunities. Cantner and Plotnikova (2009) showed a positive relationship between future 
product portfolios and technology diversification in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. 
Technology diversification enables firms to create not only new products, but also new technologies. 
Miller et al. (2007) found that the use of interdivisional knowledge positively affects technical 
development.  
Based on the above discussion, this study considers technology diversification as an essential factor in 
firm performance. I establish the hypothesis that technical variety positively affects firm profitability. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Technology diversification has a positive effect on firm performance. 
 
Firms do not diversify randomly. Firm managers assess the direction of diversification most appropriate 
to their situation. In the context of a make-or-buy decision, vertical integration is another essential 
consideration for diversification. Determining the boundaries of the firm is critical for firm performance, 
and in general, vertical integration is an essential source of boundary determination. To maintain stability 
of resource supply, vertical integration may be needed, particularly when the resource market is unstable. 
Technology interdependencies among vertical stages can also yield positive results. Brusoni et al. (2001) 
maintained that highly specialized technical knowledge was necessary to maximize the effectiveness of 
vertical integration. When corporations consider undertaking diversification by vertical integration, 
transaction and contracting costs are significant (Klein et al., 1978; Monteverde and Teece, 1982). 
Williamson (1971) argued that firm‘s internalize in vertical ways to avoid market failure.  
The economies of vertical integration suggest it is the main strategy for enhanced performance (Hill 
and Hoskisson, 1987; Fukui and Ushijima, 2007). Gemba and Kodama (2001) noted the diversity 
direction of Japan‘s manufacturing industries. They found that diversifying into downstream businesses 
contributed to an increase in profitability. Arocena (2008) empirically found that economies of scope exist 
in vertical integrations. Similarly, Rothaermel et al. (2006), and Forbes and Lederman (2010) indicated 
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that vertically integrated firms have high performance levels. Acemoglu et al. (2010) found that the 
downstream technology intensity is positively correlated with the likelihood of integration.  
Based on the above discussion I observe that firms are willing to diversify into vertical integration for 
enhanced performance. Therefore, I hypothesize that diversifying into vertical integration positively 
affects firm performance. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Diversifying towards vertical integration has a positive effect on performance. 
 
Figure 1–1.  Theoretical map between diversification strategy and performance 
Diversification Strategy
Business 
Diversification
Performance
Moderate the diversification strategy
Technology 
Diversification
The direction
of diversity
 
 
Figure 1–1 provides a theoretical map of business diversification, technology diversification and 
performance strategies. The map illustrates how different diversification strategies affect the economic 
objectives. A firm manager can strategically consider diversification based on two strategies: business 
diversification and technology diversification. Diversified businesses may be motivated by acquiring a 
variety of technical opportunities. To conduct many businesses, firms need to have technical variety. 
Further, having high levels of technical opportunities enhances the business portfolio.  
The effect of business diversity and technology diversity on firm performance can appear similar: 
however, they can impact in different ways. Business diversification can have positive effects on firm 
performance by exploiting common resources and efficient resource allocation. Whereas, technology 
diversification can generate a positive effect by its technical opportunities mix. Furthermore, the direction 
of diversification—such as vertical integration—is a determining factor of the diversification strategy. 
Finally, firms tend to modify their diversification strategy to attain best performance. 
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1–3. Data and Methods 
This study extracted financial data from the Development Bank of Japan (DBJ)1. The target companies 
are listed on the first and second section of the Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya stock exchanges in Japan. The 
study includes data from companies from the old JASDAQ security exchange, the market of the 
high-growth and emerging stocks (Mothers), and the Nippon New Market Hercules stock exchange. The 
patents application data for each target company was collected using the Institute of Intellectual Property 
(IIP) database2. Japanese company annual reports have been obliged to clarify their business segment data 
since 1998, hence, this research examines the ten year period from 1998 to 2008. A sample of 265 
electronic firms was selected using unbalanced panel data. 
 
Dependent Variable 
A lot of research has used ROA (return on assets) as a variable of firm profitability (Grant et al., 1988; 
Robins and Wiersema, 1995; Degryse and Ongena, 2001; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002; Fukui and 
Ushijima, 2007). As ROA is one of the most widely employed measures of financial performance, for this 
study I regarded the ROA as firm profitability. To establish how business diversification, technology 
diversification, direction of diversity and other control factors affects firm profitability, I set up 
explanatory variables described below.  
 
Explanatory Variables 
This research examined business diversification by extracting data from corporations‘ annual reports. 
Each business segment is identified by a four-digit Japan Standard Industrial Classification (JSIC) code in 
order to specify what they make. To establish the business diversification index, I defined two aspects of 
the business diversification activity: business concentration and business diversification. I used the 
Herfindahl index to measure the concentration of sales among the business segments. This paper 
measured the sales of each firm in the business sectors using the Herfindahl Business Concentration 
index. If a firm concentrates its sales in one business sector, its business concentration index would be 
close to 1. If a firm distributes its sales among many businesses, its business concentration index would 
be close to 0.  
I focused on comparing the number of business segments to firm size. Business Diversification is 
measured by the number of businesses per total sales. While business concentration measures the 
concentration of sales among the businesses, business diversification considers the breadth of business 
diversity. The bigger the firm size, the more the firm may diversify its business. Previous research 
                                                        
1
 http://www.dbj.jp/ricf/en/databank/ 
2
 http://www.iip.or.jp/patentdb/index.html, see Goto and Motohashi (2007) 
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emphasized the importance of firm size to diversification (Wolf, 1977; Goto, 1981; Castaldi et al., 2006). 
To establish an adequate index of business diversification normalized by firm size, it is necessary to 
control firm size. Hence, business diversification is a proxy variable of firm size.  
To clarify the firm‘s patent activity, this research collected patent application data from the IIP patent 
data base. Not all innovations are patented: however, patent data has been used as a major indicator of 
innovative technology capabilities (Scherer, 1965; Pakes, 1986; Levin et al., 1987; Trajtenberg, 1990; Hitt 
et al., 1991; Hall et al., 2000; 2001; Silverman, 1999; Harhoff et al., 2003; Tokumaru, 2006). Therefore, 
this research draws on patent application data to explain a firm‘s technical knowledge. I defined two 
aspects of technology diversification: technology concentration and technology diversification. I used the 
Herfindahl index of firm patents to measure Technology Concentration using subclasses of the 
International Patent Classification (IPC). I also measured Technology Diversification as the number of 
subclasses in the IPC divided by total sales. This index indicates the breadth of technical variety to firm 
size.  
Not all patents are useful. Harhoff et al. (2003) point out that many patents are economically worthless, 
and Reitzig (2003) revealed that most patents have both relevant and redundant characteristics. 
Trajtenberg (1990) and Hall et al. (2000; 2001) showed that using citation-weighted counts to measure 
patent quality is more suitable than using simple counts. Therefore, this study examined both simple 
count models and citation-weighted models of Citation Count (CC), to determine the worth of patent 
application data. To re-scale the citation intensities of year and field interaction effects, I introduced the 
―fixed-effects‖ approach method of Hall et al. (2001). This method measures patent citation value as 
normalized by average cited tendencies for technology fields and year trends. 
To ascertain the effects of vertical integration on performance, this study used an input-output (IO) 
table. First, I matched IO industry codes to the JSIC four-digit classification code. From IO table, top 10 
upstream sectors were chosen for each industry according to amount of its purchase. Similarly, top 10 
downstream sectors were chosen according to amount of its sales. I then specified top sale business 
segment as a main segment, and other business segment as sub segments in each firm‘s business segment 
data. If the sub segment was specified by the related upstream—or downstream—10 industries of the 
main segment, I input the Upstream—or Downstream—dummy variable. I used these variables to 
estimate how vertical integration affects firm performance.  
Some manufacturing firms in Japan diversify into a non-manufacturing business—such as real estate, 
finance, hotel and resort industries. Resource-based knowledge coherence is less relevant to 
non-manufacturing industries than to manufacturing industries. Firm managers hardly exploit 
manufacturing‘s Research and Development (R&D) knowledge into non-manufacturing businesses. In the 
above theories, lack of knowledge concerning the non-manufacturing business diversified may have 
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different effect with manufacturing business. As the electronic equipment industry is studied here, I 
controlled diversification into a non-manufacturing industry. To control the effect of non-manufacturing 
business, I examined each business segment name and description in its financial annual report to identify 
the non-manufacturing businesses. This research established a Non-manufacturing dummy for firms 
diversified into a non-manufacturing industry sector such as banking, real estate, hotel, transport, and 
service.  
To control a firm‘s technical quantitative knowledge, this study calculated Patent intensity: measured 
by the patent stock divided by total sales. Because technology knowledge is cumulative knowledge, and 
recent knowledge is more valuable than past knowledge, this research used the patent stock as sum of 
five-year patents application with a fixed 20% annual depreciation rate. Firms conduct R&D investment 
to enrich technology opportunities not only to exploit prior technology capabilities but to also acquiring 
new technology. Throughout the R&D investment process technology knowledge is an intangible fixed 
asset: firms thus attempt to achieve optimal levels of R&D investments dependent on their own technical 
opportunities, market demands and product innovations. Researchers have focused on the relationship 
between R&D investment and the diversification activity (Hitt et al., 1991; Hoskisson and Johnson, 1992; 
Silverman, 1999; Garcia-Vega, 2006; Miller, 2006). Therefore, this research controls the effect of R&D 
intensity measured by R&D expenditures divided by total sales. To control firm size, I established Firm 
size as the log of the number of employees. Because leverage can affect a firm‘s performance (Tallman 
and Lee, 1996; Miller, 2006), this study included a Leverage variable measured by long-term debt per 
total assets. Moreover, year dummies are included to regulate the effect of time factors.  
The main model of regressions and correlation matrix is as follows. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
  Table 1–1 shows the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix across the variables. 
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Table 1–1.  Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Note: CC means citation count value of patents number. ***: Statistically significant at the 1% level. **: Statistically significant at the 5% level. *: Statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 ROA 0.048 0.054 1
2 Business Concentration 0.757 0.259 0.191 *** 1
3 Business Diversification 0.077 0.187 -0.068 *** -0.045 * 1
4 Technology Concentration 0.360 0.275 0.073 *** 0.254 *** 0.198 *** 1
5 Technology Diversification 0.275 0.465 -0.007 0.056 ** 0.383 *** -0.160 *** 1
6 Technology Diversification (CC) 0.081 0.320 -0.015 0.040 * 0.421 *** -0.079 *** 0.889 *** 1
7 Upstream Dummy 0.045 0.207 -0.087 *** -0.244 *** -0.038 -0.163 *** -0.019 -0.005 1
8 Downstream Dummy 0.031 0.172 0.033 -0.148 *** 0.007 -0.052 ** 0.002 0.002 -0.039 1
9 Non-manufacturing Dummy 0.251 0.434 -0.012 -0.422 *** 0.183 *** -0.052 ** 0.061 ** 0.026 0.138 *** 0.175 *** 1
10 Patent Intensity 3.079 11.026 0.027 0.043 * 0.019 -0.094 *** 0.763 *** 0.740 *** 0.012 -0.002 -0.004 1
11 Patent Intensity (CC) 2.991 11.158 0.020 0.047 ** 0.072 *** -0.083 *** 0.731 *** 0.744 *** 0.017 -0.005 -0.012 0.977 *** 1
12 R&D Intensity 0.044 0.033 -0.077 *** 0.044 * 0.055 ** -0.044 * 0.109 *** 0.051 ** -0.018 0.081 *** -0.019 0.069 *** 0.053 ** 1
13 Firm Size 6.582 1.167 -0.091 *** -0.354 *** -0.390 *** -0.457 *** -0.262 *** -0.133 *** 0.249 *** 0.069 *** 0.042 * -0.061 ** -0.064 *** 0.019 1
14 Leverage 0.047 0.061 -0.293 *** -0.112 *** 0.144 *** 0.029 0.039 0.056 ** 0.031 0.034 0.035 -0.026 -0.015 -0.078 *** -0.087 *** 1
15 
 
1–4. Analyses and Results 
Multiple regression analysis was used to analyze the effects of each concentration and diversification 
on profitability. To control each firm‘s unobserved effects, I used fixed-effects estimation. Hausman‘s 
evaluation test was used to examine each model, showing that a fixed-effect is preferable to a 
random-effect in all models. Model 1 examines the concentration effect of diversification, and Model 2 
tests the effect of diversification side. Model 3 includes interaction term between both diversification 
indices, and Model 4 estimates both concentration and diversification indices. Table 1–2 shows the 
regression results of the simple count for patent variables, and Table 1–3 indicates the citation count 
results of Table 1–2.  
Table 1–2.  Regression results of simple count for patent variables 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Year time dummies are abbreviated on tables. ***: Statistically 
significant at the 1% level. **: Statistically significant at the 5% level. *: Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4
Business Concentration 0.0389 ** 0.0359 **
(0.0168) (0.0161)
Business Diversification –0.0651 *** –0.4477 *** –0.4496 ***
(0.0192) (0.0381) (0.0381)
Technology Concentration –0.0034 0.0030
(0.0054) (0.0054)
Technology Diversification 0.0131 *** 0.0078 * 0.0081 *
(0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0042)
Business Diversification × 0.0412 *** 0.0410 ***
    Technology Diversification (0.0036) (0.0036)
Upstream Dummy –0.0029 –0.0054 –0.005 –0.0028
(0.0340) (0.0339) (0.0324) (0.0324)
Downstream Dummy 0.0167 0.0167 0.0207 ** 0.0219 **
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0103) (0.0103)
Non-Manufacturing Dummy –0.0140 * –0.0178 *** –0.0021 0.0035
(0.0073) (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0072)
Patent Intensity –0.0001 –0.0005 *** –0.0004 ** –0.0004 **
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
R&D Intensity –1.0244 *** –1.0076 *** –0.9022 *** –0.8949 ***
(0.0648) (0.0651) (0.0630) (0.0631)
Firm Size 0.0043 0.0038 –0.0018 –0.0019
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Leverage –0.1512 *** –0.1496 *** –0.1407 *** –0.1408 ***
(0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0244) (0.0244)
Constant 0.0500 * 0.0857 *** 0.1390 *** 0.1098 ***
(0.0273) (0.0238) (0.0232) (0.0265)
Firm fixed-effects Included Included Included Included
Year Dummies (1998–2007) Included Included Included Included
Number of observations 1733 1733 1733 1733
R-Square (Within) 0.3029 0.3075 0.3652 0.3674
16 
 
 
Table 1–3.  Regression results of citation count for patent variables 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. CC means citation count value of patents number. Year time 
dummies are abbreviated on tables. ***: Statistically significant at the 1% level. **: Statistically significant at the 
5% level. *: Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
The results of Table 1–2 (simple count), and Table 1–3 (citation count), show highly similar and 
consistent results for each explanatory variable. All empirical results are consistent and stable for both 
simple and citation count models.  
Model 1, 4, 5, and 8 show business concentration has a positive and statistically significant relationship 
with ROA when considered with all the control variables. This result implies that specialized firms 
performed better than diversified firms. Furthermore, business diversification is significantly negative in 
 Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8
Business Concentration 0.0390 ** 0.0386 **
(0.0168) (0.0161)
Business Diversification –0.0818 *** –0.4035 *** –0.4055 ***
(0.0194) (0.0359) (0.0359)
Technology Concentration –0.0036 –0.0018
(0.0054) (0.0052)
Technology Diversification (CC) 0.0257 *** 0.0130 ** 0.0127 **
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052)
Business Diversification × 0.0365 *** 0.0363 ***
    Technology Diversification (CC) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Upstream Dummy –0.0028 –0.0060 –0.0058 –0.0028
(0.0340) (0.0337) (0.0325) (0.0325)
Downstream Dummy 0.0168 0.0166 0.0203 ** 0.0216 **
(0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0103) (0.0103)
Non-Manufacturing Dummy –0.014 * –0.0180 *** –0.0043 0.0019
(0.0073) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0072)
Patent Intensity (CC) –0.0002 –0.0008 *** –0.0005 *** –0.0005 ***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
R&D Intensity –1.0237 *** –1.0010 *** –0.9067 *** –0.9015 ***
(0.0648) (0.0647) (0.0631) (0.0631)
Firm Size 0.0040 0.0028 –0.0019 –0.0020
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Leverage –0.1510 *** –0.1488 *** –0.1408 *** –0.1418 ***
(0.0255) (0.0253) (0.0244) (0.0244)
Constant 0.0519 * 0.0944 *** 0.1388 *** 0.1093 ***
(0.0273) (0.0237) (0.0233) (0.0265)
Firm fixed-effects Included Included Included Included
Year Dummies (1998–2007) Included Included Included Included
Number of observations 1733 1733 1733 1733
R-Square (Within) 0.3037 0.3149 0.3633 0.3659
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all models. The results of business concentration and business diversification measures coherently 
indicate that diseconomies of scope exist in diversified businesses (Hypothesis 1a is rejected, Hypothesis 
1b is supported). 
Technology concentration exhibits no significant results. However, technology diversification has a 
positive effect on ROA, in contrast to business diversification. This result indicates that technology 
variety is a positive factor of profitability in all specifications (Hypothesis 2 is supported). Taken in 
comparison with the business diversification results, it is proven that business and technology 
diversifications have different effects on firm profitability. The positive and statistically significant 
relationship between technological variety and firm performance is found in not only model 2, 3, 4 
(simple count), but also model 6, 7, and 8(citation count). 
To test the combined effects between business and technology diversifications, Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 of 
this study examine their interaction variables. The interaction term‘s effect of both diversifications has a 
positive relationship with ROA. Looking at the combined effects, the study found the results for each 
diversification‘s coefficients to be significantly consistent. Further, the synergy effect between the 
diversifications is verified. In relation to the total coefficient effect of each diversification: the effect of 
business diversification on performance is positively dependent on technology diversification, and the 
effect of technology diversification on performance is positively dependent on business diversification. 
Specialized firms, or firms with small amounts of business diversification, have small positive technology 
diversification effects. Largely business diversified firms can acquire more profits by diversifying into 
technology fields. Large levels of business diversification positively affect the technology diversification 
effect on performance. 
The vertical integration of the upstream dummy shows no significant results in any models. However, 
Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 show that the downstream dummy has a possibility of positive effects on 
performance (Hypothesis 3 is partly supported). These results coherently support the results of Gemba 
and Kodama (2001) and Acemoglu et al. (2010), indicating that downstream diversification generates 
positive effects. Moreover, Models 1, 2, 5, and 6 show that the non-manufacturing business dummy has a 
negative relationship with firm performance. R&D intensity has a negative effect on performance. 
Unexpected R&D investment can have a negative impact on profitability. Large sunk costs are essential 
for the electronics industry to be competitive. Hence, a firm‘s R&D investment would be larger than the 
optimal level, because R&D is a negative factor. Leverage is also a negative factor of firm profitability in 
all the empirical models included in the study. 
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1–5. Discussion 
This study comprehensively examines how business diversification and technology diversification 
affect firm performance. Empirical results significantly represented the negative effects of business 
diversity. Firms that diversify their businesses are less profitable than specialized firms. Further, the 
number of businesses a firm is involved in per firm size has a negative effect on performance. This result 
can be explained by the diseconomies of scope, particularly in cases of non-manufacturing business 
diversification. From a specific investment viewpoint, there is more profitability in specialized businesses 
than in diversified firms. One reason for diversification failure is the increased requirements for specific 
investment and knowledge that diversification brings. The electronics industry is characterized by intense 
competition and firms need to concentrate on their main business, investing in specific assets to 
effectively compete. This can explain the study results that show excessive business diversification to 
have a negative effect on firm profitability.  
From a technology strategy viewpoint, technology diversification has positive effects on firm 
profitability, strongly supporting the importance of technical variety for enhanced performance. Moreover, 
firms possessing diverse technology knowledge can improve profitability by undergoing business 
diversification. This result is robust and consistent in both the simple count patent model and the citation 
count model. The empirical results of the relationships between technology diversification and ROA 
explain why firms have to acquire many fields of technology, also supporting the results of Miller (2006). 
To assimilate more profit, a firm needs to acquire a wider spread of technology, unlike in business 
diversification. This research indicates that having expertise in a variety of technical fields is a key factor 
for the electronics industry, as it requires a broad range of parts and technologies. This empirical result 
strongly supports previous research highlighting the importance of technology variety (Robins and 
Wiersema, 1995; Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998; Suzuki and Kodama, 2004; Garcia-Vega, 2006; Miller 
2006; Miller et al., 2007; Cantner and Plotnikova, 2009). 
The results of this research show that downstream diversification has positive effects on performance. 
This result can explain the existence of downstream vertical economies in the electronics industry. These 
results all point to a conclusion that firms must consider the direction of vertical integration to enrich their 
profitability. 
After the depression of the 1990s, Japanese firms needed to develop new strategies for survival. Large 
business diversification is resulted in diseconomies of scope, therefore, firms reconstructed their 
businesses diversification strategies (Miyajima and Inagaki, 2003) towards technology diversity. The 
complexity of products has dramatically increased in the electronics industry, particularly in the last few 
decades. As products require a greater combination of parts, the more diversity of technology knowledge 
from different technologies is needed. The study results reveal the negative effects of business 
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diversification and the positive effects of technology diversification, coherently supporting why firms 
have reduced their product diversity while increasing their technical variety (Gambardella and Torrisi, 
1998). 
Throughout these empirical results, I found different effects of business and technology diversification 
on performance. Overall, these results suggest that to precisely establish the effect of diversification 
researchers should consider not only the business elements impacting on a firm, but also the technology 
elements and the direction of the diversification. 
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2. Ownership, Learning and Innovation: An Empirical Analysis of the Japanese 
Automotive Industry 
 
2–1. Introduction 
Partnership relations and technology transfers are keys objectives of business network research in 
recent decades (Peters and Becker, 1997-98; Ahmadjian and Lincoln, 2001; Kohtamäki, 2010; Kotabe, 
2003). Partnership structures, such as ownership and governance groups in the automotive industry, not 
only preserve sustainable supply chains but also enable collaborations and generate learning and 
innovation among members. Previous research has shown that groups of firms can enrich their 
technological capacity via their members‘ cooperative innovation. Asanuma (1989), Attewell (1992) and 
Sako (1996) found that the organizational learning effect is a major incentive for construction 
organizations to integrate their internal absorptive capacities. Furthermore, Ahmadjian and Lincoln (2001) 
showed the learning effect experienced in alliances is a significant reason why the governance 
relationship is valuable in the automotive industry; also, Kotabe et al. (2003) indicated that technological 
transfers are positively related to a supplier‘s performance. Although these earlier studies consider 
organizational learning (using interview and questionnaire data techniques), there is very little 
quantitative analysis to date. Accordingly, this research examines organizational learning within a 
governance relationship using firms‘ financial and patent application data.  
The automotive industry has an extensive and complex structure to enable the manufacture of 
automotive vehicles as final products. In manufacturing of this kind, a number of elements come into 
play: design, research and development (R&D), materials and parts. Automotive manufacturers often 
organize long-term governance groups to maintain their governance relationship and supply chain 
stability. Such groups are common, particularly in Japan, and are composed of successful companies such 
as Toyota, Honda, and Nissan. These companies create governance groups with a significant production 
capacity that makes millions of cars annually. The intensive and long-term governance relationship is 
often considered a characteristic of the Japanese automotive industry (Asanuma, 1989; Ahmadjian and 
Lincoln, 2001; Kotabe, 2003), and has enabled groups to enrich their productivity. Moreover, the value 
chain governance structure generally offers lower transaction costs and is a further reason why Japanese 
automotive firms have achieved a competitive advantage (Dyer, 1996). Such governance also acts to 
lower internal transaction costs (Williamson, 1971; 1985; Dyer, 1996), and to avoid supply stoppages 
(Asanuma, 1989) and contract hazards (Ahmadjian and Lincoln, 2001). The automotive industry has 
needed significant levels of new and complex technology to conduct its vehicle assembling process in the 
last decade. Manufacturing firms must now invest heavily in R&D to acquire the necessary technology 
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capacity for the relevant complex and varied systems. These technology requirements not only concern a 
vehicle‘s primary components (e.g., engine combustion systems and power trains), but also its safety 
equipment, drive assistant systems and the electronic control systems that are increasingly common; 
modern electronic technology can provide greater efficiency (Henderson and Clark, 1990). The need for 
such complex parts requires a variety of technological knowledge: in the context of studies in this area, 
the transfer of technological information and R&D spillover are important in the organization of the 
automotive industry (Peters and Becker, 1997-98). The automotive industry requires high levels of 
specific investment and long-term contracts, hence its governance relationship is more important than in 
other manufacturing industries. Specific asset requirements in the automotive industry have forced firms 
to create long-term and sustainable organizations (Williamson, 1985). 
The relationship between organizational learning and the diffusion of knowledge is a significant issue 
in strategic management research. The main objective of this paper is to examine the existence of the 
spillover effect within the governance structure to clarify why firms construct ownership relations. 
Generally speaking, the automotive industry in Japan is characterized as having extensive and robust 
ownership relationships in contrast to the situation in the United States or Europe. Long-term and stable 
contracts, and close asset and management relationships are common features of the Japanese automotive 
industry. Earlier studies used questionnaire data to examine relationship effects; in contrast I used 
quantitative data to measure the spillover effect in a governance relationship. This empirical method 
provides direct and ample evidence of organizational spillover effects. 
I examined a hypothesis that a member‘s technology depends on not only its own technological 
capacity, but also on the technological capacity of other members within the group governance. I defined 
ownership relationships for Japanese automotive firms based on their annual reports. Thus, it is an 
appropriate industry to estimate the effects of ownership structures. Furthermore, firms‘ patent application 
data were collected to measure technology knowledge. I used patent data to determine a firm‘s 
technological capacity and how the effect of organizational learning affects technological capacity. Panel 
data were used to analyze 103 firms between from 1991 to 2008, and a series of linear regression model 
scenarios were conducted to clarify the hypotheses. The empirical results show that the technical 
knowledge of other group members has a positive effect on a firm‘s knowledge growth. Moreover, a 
spillover effect regarding technology distance was considered, and the results show that technologically 
close knowledge has a greater positive effect than technologically distant knowledge. These results 
indicate that the governance relationship is an important boundary of technology flow and that 
cooperation within the ownership relationship is an efficient structure to enrich organizational learning. 
 
 
22 
 
2–2. Hypotheses 
I consider the governance relationship to be a valuable structure for exploiting the existing technical 
knowledge of other members. Group members can exploit the technical knowledge of other members and 
also benefit from the ownership relation. Group members are willing to cooperate both in terms of 
technical knowledge and business know-how to enhance the group‘s overall performance. Hence, firms 
can enjoy the technology spillover effects of the internal governance structure. This technology transfer 
has easier and more efficient spillover effects than firms experience outside the ownership relation. Cohen 
and Levinthal (1990) found that an organization‘s absorptive capacity depends on the absorptive 
capacities of its individual members. By sharing and exploiting the technological capacity and know-how 
of other members, each member‘s innovation affects the technology and know-how of others. A mutual 
interdependence in terms of spillover can easily occur in the automotive industry, as the assembly of a 
complete vehicle requires an extensive construction system. By the transfer of technical knowledge within 
an alliance, members can enrich their innovative opportunities. Therefore, I propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The technology capacity of the parent company and subsidiaries has a positive effect 
on a firm’s technological performance. 
 
When researching the spillover effect of a firm‘s ownership relationships each firm‘s absorptive 
capacity is considered. A firm‘s prior knowledge is required to help absorb further technology information. 
Firms can only internalize technology capacity if there is a high level of technology capacity with the 
group. The theory of innovation flow states that the learning effect (i.e., exploiting each member‘s 
absorptive capacity) is a major incentive to establish a group (Asanuma, 1989; Attewell, 1992; Sako, 
1996; Kotabe et al., 2003). In other words, absorptive capacity is an essential factor to exploit prior 
technology and to create new technology innovation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 1990, Ahmadjian and 
Lincoln, 2001).  
However, not all external technology capacity has the same effect on a firm‘s internal technological 
performance. Firms can easily assimilate the technology spillover effect within its existing technology 
fields. I thus believe that previously acquired technology is a valuable measure of technological distance. 
In other words, technology capacity from distant technology fields may have a reduced spillover effect 
even if there are extensive technological opportunities within the group. As a result, I consider that the 
technologically close knowledge of a parent company or subsidiary may have a greater effect on spillover 
than technologically distant knowledge. Thus, technology spillover from a technologically close field has 
a greater positive effect than technologically distant fields.  
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Hypothesis 2: The spillover effect from technologically close sectors has a greater positive effect 
than technologically distant sectors. 
 
Joint patent activity is a further important indicator of information diffusion. Some researchers point 
out that R&D alliances are an important strategy that affects firm performance. Group members can 
acquire and share technological know-how and information via cooperative R&D relationships. In 
relation to internal exchange of information, joint patent activity among group members is tangible 
evidence of R&D partnership. In other words, joint patent experience among the members represents 
cooperative R&D activity frequency among the companies. I believe that cooperative research is an 
essential factor of the governance structure, and therefore, propose the following hypothesis that joint 
patenting activity is a positive factor for a firm‘s technological performance.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Joint patents within an internal ownership structure have a positive effect on a firm’s 
technological innovation. 
 
  Finally, this paper makes a comparative analysis between the spillover effect within and outside of an 
ownership group. The diffusion of technological knowledge is frequently hampered by transfer barriers. 
Members of the ownership group can easily exploit other members‘ technological capacity; meanwhile, 
there is restricted cooperative spillover for external firms because they have no cooperative relationships 
with the group. Outside of the organization, competitive, rival relationships can hamper the knowledge 
transfer (Attewell, 1992); such relationships among rivals mean that cooperation is difficult. However, 
group members are generally willing to cooperate with each other when they share the same objective: the 
profitability of the group. Within the organization, they can easily transfer the knowledge to each other, 
resulting in spillover innovation and information flow among members. In other words, the border of the 
group restricts technology spillover and information flow. If the governance group is an optimal structure 
for technological information flow, the group‘s spillover has a greater positive effect internally than 
externally. Hence, I expect here that the border of the ownership group is a critical element of information 
flow. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The spillover effect within the ownership group has a greater effect on a firm’s 
technological performance than a spillover effect from outside the group. 
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2–3. Data and Variables 
To collect the financial status of each sample firm, we obtained financial data from the Development 
Bank of Japan (DBJ).3 Targeted firms were those that engage in automotive manufacturing as their main 
business, and are listed in the first and second sections of the Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya stock exchanges 
in Japan. Companies that produce complete automotive vehicles, such as Toyota, Honda, Nissan, 
Mitsubishi, Mazda, Suzuki, Daihatsu, Fuji Heavy Industries (FHI), Isuzu, UD Trucks and Hino, are very 
large and have very different characteristics than other companies. These vehicle manufacturers not only 
assemble entire cars but are also responsible for the design of all their vehicles. As they are responsible 
for design covering the many aspects of the vehicle manufacturing progress, these manufacturers also 
have more patents than auto-parts makers. This heterogeneity can be seen in the mean number of patent 
applications for vehicle manufacturers and parts makers: vehicle manufacturers average ten times the 
number of patents (1,171) than parts manufacturers (113) each year. These particular size and patent 
activity features set vehicle manufacturers apart from firms that only produce auto-parts. Hence, these 11 
vehicle manufacturers were excluded from the sample companies, but were included as parent companies. 
As a result, 103 samples from the automotive industry were selected using unbalanced panel data. This 
research examines an 18-year period, 1991–2008.  
To identify the ownership structure, I looked at the affiliate companies listed in each firms‘ annual 
reports. Affiliate companies identified in the annual reports were used to define the parent company and 
subsidiaries of each firm.4 A parent company and subsidiary relationship shows the ownership structure 
that involves both a capital and a technology alliance relationship. Figure 2–1 shows the sample firms that 
are also a parent company of a vehicle manufacturing company. Toyota has the largest number of 
subsidiaries (14), followed by Honda (12). Some sample firms also have a parent company.  
 
 
                                                        
3
 http://www.dbj.jp/ricf/en/databank/ 
4
 Not all subsidiaries are listed in the section on affiliate companies. Larger companies in the Japanese 
manufacturing industry can have more than 1,000 subsidiaries, thus, only relatively large and important 
subsidiaries are included.  
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Figure 2–1. Number of vehicle manufacturer subsidiaries per parent company in the sample firms 
 
 
To clarify the firm‘s technological capacity, this research takes a firm‘s technological capacity to be the 
number of patents it has been granted. The use of patent data is a common technique to determine 
technology levels, because patent data have been used in many studies as a major indicator of innovative 
technology capabilities (Scherer, 1965; Pakes, 1986; Levin et al., 1987; Trajtenberg, 1990; Hitt et al., 
1991; Hall et al., 2000; 2001; Silverman, 1999; Harhoff et al., 2003; Tokumaru, 2006). Patent application 
data for each sample company were collected from the Institute of Intellectual Property (IIP) database.5 
Data regarding patent applications for the sample firms, parent company and subsidiaries was extracted to 
measure the level of technological knowledge for each group. Each patent application was compiled 
together with each target firm‘s group to measure the technological knowledge of that group.  
 
Dependent Variable 
This paper considers the sample firms‘ technological performance as a dependent variable. The firm is 
willing to make an application for patents to assure its own technology, thus an analysis of patent data is a 
good measure of a firm‘s technology. Hence, the number of its patents is taken as a proxy variable of a 
firm‘s technological performance. We set a target firm’s number of patent applications as a dependent 
variable, representing technological performance. 
Not all patents are valuable. Harhoff et al. (2003) pointed out that many patents are economically 
worthless, and Reitzig (2003) revealed that most patents have both relevant and redundant characteristics. 
Many researchers have used triadic counts to measure the value of each patent (Haroff et al., 1999; Jensen 
et al., 2005; Bacchiocchi and Montobbio, 2007). This study examines both simple counts (SC) and triadic 
                                                        
5
 http://www.iip.or.jp/patentdb/index.html, see Goto and Motohashi (2007). 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
26 
 
counts (TC) to determine the value of patent application data. For TC variables, I counted the number of 
patents a firm applied for in Japan, the United States and with the European Patents Office (EPO). Briefly, 
the SC patent numbers provide a quantitative value and the TC numbers focuses on the qualitative value 
of each patent. Thus, the average mean value of the sample firms‘ number of patents (applied for in Japan, 
the United States and with the EPO) per year (25.9) is approximately one fifth that of the SCs (126.9). 
These SC and TC numbers are also calculated in each explanatory variable below to consider the value of 
patents. 
 
Explanatory variables 
I calculated the previous patent applications of each firm‘s parent company and subsidiaries to measure 
technological spillover capacity within the governance group, because I assume that prior technological 
capacity of each parent company and subsidiaries affects the future technological performance of a 
sample firm. As technology knowledge is cumulative, and recent knowledge is more valuable than old, I 
assume that prior technological knowledge from four years ago until last year can affect technological 
performance. This research used patent stock as the sum of a four-year period of patent applications with 
a fixed 20% annual depreciation rate. As a result, Parent company patents is calculated by looking at a 
parent company‘s patent stock (i.e., the number of patents owned) and Subsidiaries patents is a 
subsidiary‘s patent stock variable. 
I then considered the spillover effect model of technological distance. I distinguished between sectors 
that are technologically close and those that are technologically distant. Technological distance was 
determined using subclasses from the International Patent Classification (IPC) of the patents that 
classifies patents based on technology sector. I assume that firms can easily assimilate technological 
capacity in areas where they already possess some know-how and skills; in contrast, it is more difficult 
for firms to exploit technological capacity in areas where they have scant prior know-how. Patents in the 
same technological sector as those already owned by a sample firm can be easily exploited for technology 
flow from other member‘s prior technology. Thus, we judge each technology sector‘s technological 
distance in terms of whether or not a firm already has patent applications in the same IPC subclass.  
I assigned a sample firm a close technological sector when it had a patent application in that IPC 
subclass and a distant technological sector when it did not hold a patent application in that IPC subclass. I 
measured same subclass patents for each parent company and its subsidiaries; a match was made if a 
target firm‘s patent application shared the same IPC as the patents of its parent company and subsidiaries. 
This variable determines technological knowledge from a close sector. I also defined different subclass 
patents for each parent company and its subsidiaries, calculated by a parent company‘s patents minus the 
parent company and subsidiaries‘ IPC-matched patents. In summary, the sum of parent company and 
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subsidiaries IPC-matched and IPC-unmatched patents is equal to the parent company patents and the 
subsidiaries patents. I assume that same subclass patents have a relatively close technological distance 
compared with different subclass patents (as stated in hypothesis 2). These same and different subclass 
variables are also stock variables like parent company patents and subsidiaries‘ patents.  
 
Table 2–1. Same and different subclass patents for sample firms 
 
Table 2–1 shows the annual average results for same and different patents of the parent companies and 
subsidiaries of the sample firms. As shown, 29% of parent company patents are in the same IPC 
categories as the firms‘ patents, and 72% of subsidiaries patents are matched. Hence, even though there is 
large pool of technological knowledge in parent companies, a greater technological similarity is found 
with subsidiaries.  
To consider the effect of cooperative research on technological performance, I measured the number of 
joint patents between parent companies and subsidiaries. I regard the number of joint patents to represent 
the internal cooperative R&D activity frequency within an organization; hence, a patent application that is 
jointly applied for with a parent company and subsidiaries can be calculated. Joint with parent company 
is measured by the number of joint patent stock with the parent company. Joint with subsidiaries is the 
number of joint patent stock with subsidiaries. These values imply the frequency of joint R&D activity, 
proving hypothesis 3 that tests whether joint patents have a positive effect on a firm‘s technological 
performance.  
Next, I considered the spillover effects from outside of the governance group. Unless it occurs in the 
same automotive industry field, the technological spillover effect varies depending on whether or not the 
relationship is within an alliance group. Within the same industry, another firm‘s knowledge may have a 
positive effect, however, when the firm is a rival, an external spillover effect may have a negative effect 
on future technological performance. In the strongly competitive market of the automotive industry, 
patent applications from the outside―particularly from a rival firm―may reduce a firm‘s future 
technological innovation. We considered Out-group patents, measured by the number of patent stock 
from outside the group (i.e., for the entire automotive industry sample). This variable can be implied to 
represent all outside groups in the automotive industry to test hypothesis 4.  
To control each target firm‘s technical knowledge, this study also considered R&D behavior. R&D 
investment is a significant tool for enriching technology opportunities, not only through exploiting prior 
technology capabilities but also to acquire and assimilate new technology from outside the firm. 
Total patents Same subclass (% of total) Different subclass (% of total)
Parent 2241.7 642.3 (29%) 1599.4 (71%)
Subsidiaries 40.8 29.5 (72%) 11.3 (28%)
28 
 
Therefore, this paper controlled for the effect of R&D intensity, measured by R&D expenditure divided 
by total sales. Moreover, each firm‘s log of total sales was used as Firm size to control for firm size. Year 
dummies were included to regulate the effect of year time factors.  
 
Figure 2–2. Mean value of patents of sample firms, parent companies and subsidiaries 
 
 
Figure 2–2 indicates the mean value of the patent application of each firm, parent company and 
subsidiaries. Parent company patents show a large technological pool, especially for vehicle 
manufacturing companies. In contrast, subsidiaries have a relatively small number of patents compared 
with the sample firms and the firms‘ parent companies. This trend is found with both SCs and TCs, with 
the SC value being approximately five times that of the TC for firms and parent companies and four times 
that of subsidiaries. Table 2–2 shows the descriptive statistics and correlation matrixes across the 
variables used in the linear regression models. 
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Table 2–2．Descriptive statistics and correlation matrixes 
 
 
Note: ***: Statistically significant at the 1% level. **: Statistically significant at the 5% level. *: Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Firm's patents (SC) 126.86 363.08 1
2 Firm's patents(TC) 25.95 99.86 0.966 *** 1
3 Parent patents (SC) 2241.67 3559.11 0.315 *** 0.306 *** 1
4 Parent IPC matched patents (SC) 642.30 1732.60 0.636 *** 0.603 *** 0.724 *** 1
5 Parent IPC unmatched patents (SC) 1599.37 2596.26 0.008 0.017 0.888 *** 0.325 *** 1
6 Parent patents (TC) 390.19 716.33 0.233 *** 0.236 *** 0.861 *** 0.575 *** 0.796 *** 1
7 Parent IPC matched patents (TC) 105.14 289.93 0.597 *** 0.577 *** 0.711 *** 0.955 *** 0.337 *** 0.671 *** 1
8 Parent IPC unmatched patents (TC) 285.04 564.53 -0.011 0.003 0.727 *** 0.239 *** 0.837 *** 0.925 *** 0.337 *** 1
9 Subsidiaries patents (SC) 40.80 155.70 0.587 *** 0.577 *** 0.278 *** 0.613 *** -0.029 0.198 *** 0.560 *** -0.036 1
10 Subsidiaries IPC matched patents (SC) 29.49 131.53 0.633 *** 0.627 *** 0.280 *** 0.640 *** -0.043 0.199 *** 0.586 *** -0.048 * 0.984 *** 1
11 Subsidiaries IPC unmatched patents (SC) 11.31 35.06 0.232 *** 0.213 *** 0.183 *** 0.323 *** 0.036 0.134 *** 0.289 *** 0.022 0.748 *** 0.619 *** 1
12 Subsidiaries patents (TC) 8.19 39.83 0.466 *** 0.464 *** 0.244 *** 0.554 *** -0.036 0.181 *** 0.512 *** -0.034 0.922 *** 0.923 *** 0.631 *** 1
13 Subsidiaries IPC matched patents (TC) 7.14 39.16 0.470 *** 0.470 *** 0.256 *** 0.566 *** -0.027 0.192 *** 0.525 *** -0.026 0.913 *** 0.924 *** 0.588 *** 0.996 *** 1
14 Subsidiaries IPC unmatched patents (TC) 1.05 3.66 0.037 0.022 -0.082 *** -0.021 -0.099 *** -0.089 *** -0.045 -0.090 *** 0.267 *** 0.160 *** 0.585 *** 0.229 *** 0.139 *** 1
15 Joint patents with parent 44932.23 9642.07 0.546 *** 0.500 *** 0.269 *** 0.480 *** 0.049 * 0.229 *** 0.483 *** 0.042 0.335 *** 0.358 *** 0.147 *** 0.310 *** 0.317 *** -0.020 1
16 Joint patents with subsidiaries 8194.86 2996.53 0.776 *** 0.780 *** 0.289 *** 0.651 *** -0.038 0.209 *** 0.603 *** -0.045 0.883 *** 0.923 *** 0.460 *** 0.793 *** 0.800 *** 0.080 *** 0.400 *** 1
17 Other patents (SC) 14.63 75.39 -0.119 *** -0.111 *** -0.104 *** -0.118 *** -0.063 ** -0.001 -0.073 ** 0.037 -0.096 *** -0.101 *** -0.046 -0.071 ** -0.075 *** 0.025 -0.051 * -0.107 *** 1
18 Other patents (TC) 1.82 8.38 -0.047 -0.036 0.027 0.013 0.028 0.121 *** 0.068 ** 0.118 *** -0.035 -0.039 -0.012 -0.020 -0.021 0.004 0.021 -0.035 0.918 *** 1
19 R&D intensity 0.02 0.03 0.342 *** 0.354 *** 0.256 *** 0.295 *** 0.154 *** 0.313 *** 0.341 *** 0.222 *** 0.206 *** 0.215 *** 0.112 *** 0.191 *** 0.195 *** -0.008 0.212 *** 0.256 *** 0.103 *** 0.225 *** 1
20 Firm size 7.80 0.48 0.508 *** 0.446 *** 0.467 *** 0.550 *** 0.274 *** 0.348 *** 0.515 *** 0.177 *** 0.443 *** 0.420 *** 0.390 *** 0.383 *** 0.367 *** 0.239 *** 0.324 *** 0.411 *** -0.056 * -0.015 0.213 *** 1
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2–4. Analyses and Results 
  Multiple regression analyses were measured to determine the spillover effects of a governance structure. 
As the firms are listed companies of a relatively large size and most have patent applications (only three 
of the 103 total firms had no patents), zero is seldom a dependent value. Thus, I believe that a linear 
regression model of panel data is an adequate model in this research. To control each firm‘s inherent 
differences, I used a fixed effect model for the linear regressions. Hausman‘s evaluation test was 
conducted in each model, and showed that a fixed effect is preferable to a random effect in most models. 
 
  Table 2–3. Regression results for parent companies‘ patents and subsidiaries‘ patents 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Year time dummies are abbreviated in the tables. SC: simple 
count; TC: triadic count of patent numbers. ***: Statistically significant at the 1% level. **: Statistically significant 
at the 5% level. *: Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
In model 1, the spillover effect from the parent company is positive but not significant. However, the 
 Model 1  Model 2
Y: Firm's patents (SC) Y: Firm's patents (TC)
Parent patents (SC) 0.0003
(0.0019)
Subsidiaries patents (SC) 0.177 ***
(0.048)
Parent patents (TC) 0.005 *
(0.003)
Subsidiaries patents (TC) 0.199 ***
(0.045)
Out-group patents (SC) -0.0013 **
(0.0005)
Out-group patents (TC) -0.002 *
(0.001)
R&D Intensity 326.813 ** 109.445 ***
(141.956) (41.833)
Firm Size 227.782 *** 39.642 ***
(37.356) (10.984)
Constant -1612.745 *** -275.719 ***
(294.477) (89.209)
Firm fixed-effects Included Included
Year Dummies (1991–2007) Included Included
Number of observations 1208 1208
R-Square (Within) 0.1263 0.1229
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subsidiaries spillover effects have a very positive and significant relationship with a firm‘s technological 
performance on 0.177 coefficient at the 1 percent level. The out-group patents effect is negative factor for 
firm‘s technological innovation at the 5 percent level. Model 2 considers each patent‘s value weight by 
TC; these results are more interesting and empirically significant than model 1. The spillover effect from 
both parent company and subsidiaries‘ knowledge has a positive effect on a firm‘s technological 
performance (hypothesis 1 is supported). This result implies that the members of an ownership group 
have a positive effect on future technological performance, supporting the existence of organizational 
learning. A comparison of parent company and subsidiaries‘ coefficients shows that the effect of 
subsidiaries is greater than the effect of the parent company (0.199 > 0.005). 
A spillover effect from outside the group has a negative effect on a firm‘s technological performance in 
both model 1 (−0.0013) and model 2 (−0.002). This result can be interpreted as suggesting that a rival‘s 
technological capabilities may reduce a firm‘s future research potential. Further, R&D intensity is shown 
to have a positive effect on technological performance in both models. This result implies that a large 
R&D investment may enhance a firm‘s technological know-how. Moreover, firm size positively affects a 
firm‘s technological performance, showing that a large firm can increase its technology levels. 
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Table 2–4. Regression results of Same and Different subclass patents 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Year time dummies are abbreviated on tables. SC: simple count; 
TC: triadic count of patents number. ***: Statistically significant at the 1% level. **: Statistically significant at the 
5% level. *: Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Models 3 and 4 are technological distance models where the spillover effect from ownership is 
categorized as same subclass or different subclass. Considering both effects, my empirical results show 
that spillover from same subclass patents has a greater significant positive effect on technological 
performance rather than different subclass fields. This result implies that in a technologically close sector 
 Model 3  Model 4
Y: Firm's patents (SC) Y: Firm's patents (TC)
Parent Same patents (SC) 0.020 ***
(0.003)
Parent Different patents (SC) -0.011 ***
(0.002)
Subsidiaries Same patents (SC) 0.004
(0.070)
Subsidiaries Different patents (SC) 0.185
(0.189)
Parent Same patents (TC) 0.019 ***
(0.005)
Parent Different patents (TC) -0.001
(0.003)
Subsidiaries Same patents (TC) 0.128 ***
(0.050)
Subsidiaries Different patents (TC) -0.347
(0.496)
Out-group patents (SC) -0.001
(0.001)
Out-group patents (TC) -0.001
(0.001)
R&D Intensity 288.330 ** 101.341 **
(138.560) (41.740)
Firm Size 189.362 *** 32.662 ***
(36.761) (11.145)
Constant -1327.720 *** -225.380 **
(296.480) (90.159)
Firm fixed-effects Included Included
Year Dummies (1991–2007) Included Included
Number of observations 1208 1208
R-Square (Within) 0.1718 0.1316
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is easier to exploit another member‘s technological capacity (thus, hypothesis 2 is supported). In model 3, 
the spillover effect from the parent company of IPC-unmatched patents has a negative and significant 
relationship. The prior technological capacity of a parent company may reduce a firm‘s future 
technological performance. These effects are more clear and significant in model 4 that considers the 
value of patents by triadic count. In model 4, both parent company and subsidiaries same subclass patents 
show positive effects and are statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast, different subclass patents 
have no significant effects on a firm‘s technological performance in model 4. This also implies that the 
degree of technological distance, either IPC-matched or not, is a valuable model in this research. 
Out-group patents are statistically insignificant in both models 3 and 4, indicating that the spillover effect 
from outside the group is less important and significant than from inside of the group. Moreover, R&D 
intensity and firm size have a positive relationship in both models.  
 
Table 2–5. Regression results for joint patents 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Year time dummies are abbreviated on tables. SC: simple count; 
TC: triadic count of patents number. ***: Statistically significant at the 1% level. **: Statistically significant at the 
5% level. *: Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 Model 5  Model 6
Y: Firm's patents (SC) Y: Firm's patents (TC)
Joint with parent 0.300 *** 0.063 ***
(0.056) (0.016)
Joint with subsidiaries 3.464 *** 2.276 ***
(0.831) (0.238)
Out-group patents (SC) -0.0012 **
(0.0005)
Out-group patents (TC) -0.002 **
(0.001)
R&D Intensity 289.298 ** 95.308 **
(139.115) (39.818)
Firm Size 195.243 *** 29.438 ***
(36.688) (10.485)
Constant -1368.636 *** -191.746 **
(297.537) (85.648)
Firm fixed-effects Included IncludedYear Dummies (1991–2007) Included Included
Number of observations 1208 1208
R-Square (Within) 0.1598 0.1963
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Models 5 and 6 explain the spillover effect using the joint patent variables of the governance group. 
The results show that the experience of a joint patent with both the parent company and subsidiaries has a 
positive effect on a firm‘s performance in both models. These results imply that a joint R&D partnership 
accelerates knowledge regarding technology in the governance group. Moreover, the coefficient effect of 
joint patents with subsidiaries is higher than the effect with the parent company (3.4 > 0.3), although the 
mean value is smaller than for the parent company (14.6 for a joint patent with a parent company and 1.8 
for a joint patent with a subsidiary). Thus, a firm‘s joint R&D relationship with subsidiaries has a greater 
positive and more intense effect than with the parent company. 
 
2–5. Discussion 
This paper empirically examined the spillover effects of ownership structure in the Japanese 
automotive industry. By using firms‘ patent application and financial data, this research measured 
multiple regression models of spillover effects via empirical analyses. The results show that there is a 
positive spillover effect on a firm‘s technological performance within the governance group structure. 
There is also a concrete spillover effect in organizations, supporting the fact that firms construct 
organizational and alliance groups to help with the transfer of technological knowledge. As the 
governance relationship is a long-term and sustainable alliance structure, it also creates a positive 
partnership for future technological performance. Moreover, the fact that the effect of subsidiaries is 
greater than that of the parent company is interesting and significant. As shown in table 2–1, subsidiaries 
have a relatively small degree of technological knowledge; however, they enjoy a greater degree of 
technological similarity with the vehicle manufacturing firms than the parent companies. Furthermore, 
comparing coefficients, the effect of a cooperative relationship with subsidiaries is greater than that with 
the firm‘s parent company. This result explains why the Japanese automotive industry characteristically 
enjoys large, typically downstream, governance relationship to accelerate technological performance. 
Cooperation with the parent company may also be important, however, the relationships with subsidiaries 
appear more valuable. Hence, firms are more likely to construct larger and more robust governance 
relationships in a downstream direction in the Japanese automotive industry.  
Same and different subclass models empirically show that technological distance and similarity affects 
the technological spillover effects. Firms can easily exploit another member‘s technological capacity if 
they share expertise in that particular field. Although not all of our empirical results are useful and 
meaningful, we found that technologically close sectors have a greater positive effect than more distant 
sectors. This result indicates that technologically close knowledge can have a direct effect, and it supports 
the theory of technological distance on information flow. Some models show that IPC-unmatched parent 
patents have a negative effect on a firm‘s technological performance. The case of substitute relationship 
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of R&D investment may represent this result. In other words, a substitute relationship within the 
governance group may also occur. If R&D investment is concentrated on an upstream firm, for example 
the parent company, the firm‘s capacity for R&D may be diminished. Moreover, if the group concentrates 
its R&D investments upstream, investments by subsidiaries may be diminished. Thus, this result may 
answer the question: how does the technological capacity of the parent company and subsidiaries affect a 
firm‘s technological performance? From a group entrepreneurial perspective, R&D investment may be 
more efficient when concentrated on a parent‘s capacity. This is particularly the case in the automotive 
industry where a large R&D investment toward the parent will be needed to design, manufacture, and 
assemble the car. Therefore, a substitute relationship may exist between the sample firms and their parent 
companies in terms of R&D investment. 
This paper also measured the effect of joint patents within a group and showed that cooperative R&D 
among group members generates further technological knowledge. This result indicates that cooperative 
R&D within an alliance group is a key factor for technology innovation. Joint patents within the 
governance group indicate that there is a cooperative R&D partnership; hence, joint R&D alliance is 
another important determinant for a firm‘s technological performance. 
Spillover effects from within the governance group have a greater positive effect than firms outside of 
the group structure. This result implies that internal spillover effects show a more positive and significant 
relationship with technological performance compared with external spillover effects. This result is 
interesting, particularly when compared with earlier research. For example, Cohen and Levinthal (1989) 
found that spillover effects from the same industry had a positive effect. However, when I looked at the 
industry‘s spillover effect in terms of firms within a governance group and outside the group, the effect 
was different for each category. Spillover effects from inside the group have a positive effect; however, 
the effect from outside the group may have a negative factor. This result also implies that a governance 
group is a better structure to exploit and assimilate in-group spillover effects compared with outside firms. 
This result strongly and empirically supports that firms and organizations are willing to apply patents to 
protect their technology innovations (Mansfield, 1986; Levin et al., 1987) because of strong competition 
within the automotive industry. The result also can be interpreted as a prime example of organizational 
learning, show that ownership structure is an important barrier to technology diffusion (Ahmadjian and 
Lincoln, 2001). In summary, a spillover effect from outside the group may have a negative consequence 
on a firm‘s technological capacity, while the effect from inside the group generates a positive impact. 
Moreover, this conclusion indicates that when measuring spillover effect, ownership and alliance structure 
must be considered carefully.  
This paper has several limitations. First, not all innovations are patented. Hence, including other 
technological activities in addition to patent activity and R&D activities should be considered. Secondly, 
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the study did not measure the governance structure of the entire supply chain in the automotive group. In 
addition to ownership governance, supply chain relationship may also have spillover effects for 
innovation activity. It is difficult to define the entire supply chain structure; moreover, several auto parts 
firms supply their products to many buyers. Thus, we leave these limitations as further challenge.  
  In recent decades, many researchers have attempted to discover why firms join a governance group. 
Some researchers have stated the in-group spillover effect as a reason (Attewell, 1992; Ahmadjian and 
Lincoln, 2001; Peters and Becker, 1997–98; Sako, 1996; Kotabe et al., 2003); however, a lack of 
empirical evidence existed to support such claims. In this empirical study, we have shed light on the 
spillover effects of governance structures, showing that a governance group is a valuable approach for 
encouraging technological innovation. The ownership group, a key feature of the Japanese automotive 
industry, represents a very efficient network structure that acts to extend technological diffusion. The 
extensive and stable structure is valuable not only for secure contracts, and a close asset and management 
relationship, but also for mutual technological learning among the group members. As a result, this study 
emphasizes the importance of technological flow inside the governance group. This result strongly 
supports and clarifies the effect of the ownership structure, thus indicating that this type of organization is 
a good measure of technology diffusion.  
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3. Linkage between technology and industry: Concordance between JSIC and IPC 
of the Japanese Manufacturing Industry 
 
3–1. Introduction 
The relationship between patenting and economic performance is a significant issue in strategic 
management research. Patent data has been used as an important indicator of technology capabilities to 
estimate technological knowledge (Scherer, 1965; Pakes, 1986; Levin et al., 1987; Griliches, 1990; 
Trajtenberg, 1990; Hitt et al., 1991; Hall et al., 2000, 2001; Silverman, 1999; Harhoff et al., 2003; 
Tokumaru, 2006). Patents data has a tangible and quantitative value and are usually given a proxy value 
when used to analyze technological activity. However, a discord arises when researchers attempt to use 
patent data for the economic analyses of goods and services or for analyses at an individual firm or 
industry level. It is difficult to use patent data for analysis at the firm or industry level. There is a 
fundamental discord between industrial classification and the International Patent Classification (IPC). 
Standard Industrial Classification explains what they make goods and supply services for: IPC centers on 
which technological features and knowledge are included in the patent. To analyze patent data as an 
economic parameter, researchers have to make a concordance between the technological industrial 
categories (Kortum and Putnam, 1997; Schmoch et al., 2003; Broekel, 2007; Lybbert and Zolas, 2014). 
To match patent data to disaggregate economic data (particularly firm level analysis), the concordance 
will help to enable more empirical research (Lybbert and Zolas, 2014).  
  Establishing a link between industrial categories and technological categories has been a significant 
issue in strategic management research when using patent activities as economic data for a proxy of 
innovation behavior (Schmoch et al., 2003; Broekel, 2007; Lybbert and Zolas, 2014). Several researchers 
have attempted to construct an IPC concordance between the industrial category and technological fields. 
Kortum and Putnam (1997) made a Yale Technology Concordance between the Canadian standard 
industrial classification and IPC. Verspagen et al. (1994) showed a one-to-one match concordance 
between IPC and International Standard Industrial Classification using European Patent Office data. 
Schmoch et al. (2003) constructed the DG Concordance that provides links between 625 IPC subclasses 
and 44 manufacturing fields. Broekel (2007) made a concordance between 31 technological fields and 22 
manufacturing industries on the German Industry Classification. Lybbert and Zolas (2014) showed 
Algorithmic Links with Probabilities concordance that used the data mining approach of text matching. 
  Clearly, each country has its own industrial structure and patent activity meaning that researchers must 
consider the individual country concordance. Japanese manufacturing patents are different to those of 
other countries; hence, it is inappropriate to use another country‘s concordance for the economic analysis 
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of Japanese industries. However, to date there is no concordance between Japanese industries and IPC. 
The absence of concordance in Japan may be a problem for researchers seeking to use patent data for the 
analysis of Japanese industry.  
The main purpose of this paper is to make a concordance between Japan Standard Industrial 
Classification (JSIC) and IPC on Japanese manufacturing industries. Throughout this process we examine 
Japanese manufacturing patenting activities. We measure several descriptive analyses including 
technology profile and technological distance among the industries to explain the technological 
propensity and closeness among the Japanese manufacturing industries. By these means, we can 
determine the type and variety of linkages between industrial behavior and patenting activity.  
 
3–2. Concordance between JSIC and IPC 
The following conditions are set to construct the concordance between JSIC and IPC. The primary 
objective of this research is to establish a manufacturing industry concordance; therefore, only the 
manufacturing sector is considered. Each manufacturing industry is distinguished by a two-digit JSIC 
classification, and the firms listed on the first and second section of the Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya stock 
exchanges in Japan are considered. We aggregate all manufacturing firms into two-digit JSIC. The 
financial data were extracted from the Development Bank of Japan.6 To measure patent activity, we also 
collected each firm‘s patents application data by using the Institute of Intellectual Property database.7 We 
set the study period from 2006−2010: this covers the latest IPC version (8th Version).  
  We first collected each firm‘s patent applications for the relevant manufacturing industries. The leather 
tanning, leather products and fur skins industry (JSIC number: 20) in the study sample contained only one 
firm, and this firm had no patent applications during 2006−2010. Therefore, data from 23 industries was 
collected, ranging from food manufacturing (JSIC number: 9) to miscellaneous manufacturing (JSIC 
number: 32), and disregarding the leather industry (Table 3–1).  
                                                        
6
 http://www.dbj.jp/ricf/en/databank/ 
7
 http://www.iip.or.jp/patentdb/index.html, see Goto and Motohashi (2007) 
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Table 3–1. Number of patent applications by JSIC manufacturing industry 
 
 
  As shown in Table 3−1, information and communication electronics equipment has the highest number 
of patents (112,298), with the transportation equipment industry (91,660) in second place. Both of these 
industries include characteristics of high technology requirements, high profit, and large and remarkable 
sales share in the global market, all of which are supported by significant patenting knowledge. 
Machinery, electronic parts, and chemical industries have relatively high patent levels. These industries 
also have knowledge-based characteristics generating various technology patents. In contrast, the food, 
beverages, lumber, furniture and petroleum industries have relatively low levels of patent applications. 
These are resource-based industries that do not needed knowledge-based patents unlike machinery 
industries. Overall, we have ascertained that there is consistent patent activity throughout Japanese 
manufacturing industries.  
  Next, we matched 625 IPC subclasses and two-digit JSIC. Each top share of two-digit JSIC is linked 
with each subclass of IPC. Following measurements of Verspagen et al. (1994), Schmoch et al. (2003) 
and Borekel (2007), we linked the IPC subclasses to only one field of industry. Such one-to-one matches 
may cause the loss of secondary and tertiary information; however, it can provide direct and intuitive 
  JSIC no.. Industrial field No. of firms No. of patents
9 Food 115 3063
10 Beverages, tobacco and feed 15 856
11 Textile 71 9315
12 Lumber and wood 9 366
13 Furniture and fixtures 12 1332
14 Pulp and paper 28 4568
15 Printing 27 11012
16 Chemical 194 40493
17 Petroleum and coal 10 557
18 Plastic 38 8901
19 Rubber 18 11274
21 Ceramic, stone and clay 66 9921
22 Iron and steel 54 12229
23 Non-ferrous metal 44 16407
24 Fabricated metal 78 4409
25 General-purpose machinery 7 7436
26 Production machinery 162 35154
27 Business oriented machinery 68 84003
28 Electronic parts, devices and circuits 81 50555
29 Electrical machinery 79 71270
30 Information and communication electronics equipment 58 112298
31 Transportation equipment 118 91660
32 Miscellaneous 48 12682
total 1400 599761
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information (Schmoch et al., 2003). As a result, we made a concordance between 23 JSIC manufacturing 
industries and 596 IPC subclasses8 (see Annex 1). 
 
3–3. Concordance, technological diversity and R&D activity 
In this section we analyze the relationship between technological diversity, firm size and research and 
development (R&D) by industrial categories. R&D investment is important not only to exploit prior 
technology capabilities but also to acquire and assimilate new technology. The combination of knowledge 
from different technical fields is increasing in significance. To produce complex products, manufacturing 
firms have to acquire a variety of technological knowledge; the more complex the products a firm 
manufactures the greater the variety of technology needed. There has been considerable research showing 
that a firm‘s technology variety is a key factor for its innovation activity (Robins and Wiersema, 1995; 
Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998; Brusoni et al., 2001; Piscitello, 2004; Garcia-Vega, 2006; Miller, 2006; 
Cantner and Plotnikova, 2009). Hence, we estimate the relationships between firm size, R&D and 
technology diversity by this concordance. Also, by conducting a comparative analysis between the 
diversity of concordance and the diversity of IPC-subclass, we consider the relevance of their diversity 
indexes.  
We calculated each firm‘s technology diversity for each industry. We used the Herfindahl index to 
measure the distribution of patent applications among the industries of concordance. We defined 
technology concordance diversity as 1 minus Herfindahl index. When firms diversify into other 
technology fields, the value of technology diversity would increase. 
                                                                                                 
   
  To compare with IPC-based technology diversity, we also measured the index of technology diversity 
based on a four-digit IPC subclass. By these terms, we can compare Concordance diversity and IPC 
diversity in the context of technology diversity. IPC diversity is calculated as follows; 
                                                                                       
                                                        
8
 We focus on and analyze the manufacturing sector only. As a result of constructing the concordance, 596 of 
the 625 subclasses are linked.  
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  While Concordance diversity is measured by manufacturing industrial category, IPC diversity is based 
on the IPC technology sector. This variance is because of the differentiation between the industrial 
category and the technology category that depends on its research objectives. Table 3–4 shows the mean 
value of the technology diversity of each Concordance diversity and IPC diversity. 
 
Table 3–2. Mean technology diversity value and correlation with firm size and R&D intensity 
 
Note: ***: Statistically significant at the 1% level. **: Statistically significant at the 5% level. *: Statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
 
The general machinery industry is the most diversified: it needs a variety of technological knowledge 
to make general machinery products. In contrast, the food, pulp, industries transport, information 
machinery, and chemical industries have relatively lower diversity in their technology fields. Comparing 
both diversity indexes: IPC diversity has a relatively higher value compared with Concordance diversity, 
except for the lumber and wood industry. This result implies that the IPC diversity calculated by subclass 
category has a higher propensity than the Concordance diversity at the industrial level. In summary, 
Concordance diversity and IPC diversity have very similar values for every manufacturing industry. This 
homogeneity is also found in the correlation between Concordance diversity and IPC diversity that is 
positive and statistically significant in all manufacturing industries.  
Table 4 also indicates correlations between Concordance diversity with IPC diversity, firm size, and 
R&D intensity. We measured firm size as the log of total sales, and R&D intensity as expenditure divided 
JSIC no. Industrial field Concordance    IPC
diversity diversty
9 Food 0.36 0.56 0.87 *** 0.31 *** 0.25 ***
10 Beverages, tobacco and feed 0.40 0.56 0.92 *** 0.48 ** 0.69 ***
11 Textile 0.43 0.68 0.86 *** 0.39 *** -0.02
12 Lumber and wood 0.40 0.32 0.93 *** 0.81 *** -0.52 **
13 Furniture and fixtures 0.40 0.51 0.94 *** 0.48 ** 0.09
14 Pulp and paper 0.38 0.52 0.96 *** 0.27 * 0.37 **
15 Printing 0.39 0.69 0.89 *** 0.88 *** 0.52 **
16 Chemical 0.35 0.62 0.73 *** 0.28 *** -0.24 ***
17 Petroleum and coal 0.46 0.62 0.99 *** 0.32 0.03
18 Plastic 0.52 0.66 0.91 *** 0.41 *** 0.39 ***
19 Rubber 0.56 0.71 0.95 *** 0.52 *** 0.17
21 Ceramic, stone and clay 0.53 0.63 0.95 *** 0.48 *** -0.01
22 Iron and steel 0.42 0.57 0.94 *** 0.51 *** 0.38 ***
23 Non-ferrous metal 0.57 0.71 0.95 *** 0.38 *** 0.06
24 Fabricated metal 0.41 0.54 0.90 *** 0.48 *** 0.06
25 General-purpose machinery 0.76 0.91 0.46 ** 0.03 -0.69 ***
26 Production machinery 0.42 0.58 0.85 *** 0.38 *** 0.04
27 Business oriented machinery 0.41 0.60 0.90 *** 0.38 *** 0.05
28 Electronic parts and circuits 0.47 0.60 0.88 *** 0.29 *** -0.05
29 Electrical machinery 0.47 0.63 0.89 *** 0.37 *** 0.05
30 IC equipment 0.35 0.67 0.62 *** 0.09 -0.12
31 Transportation equipment 0.33 0.67 0.63 *** 0.12 ** -0.02
32 Miscellaneous 0.39 0.47 0.92 *** -0.02 -0.10
Corr. with Con. div. Corr. with Con. div.
& firm size & R&D intensity& IPC diversity
Corr. With Con. div.
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by total sales. As a result, firm size has a positive and significant relationship with technology diversity, 
except in the petroleum, general machinery and miscellaneous industries. This result strongly supports the 
belief that large firms tend to significantly diversify into a variety of fields, and that technology variety is 
a key factor for R&D activity. Correlations with R&D intensity differ across manufacturing industries. 
Food, beverage, pulp, printing, plastic and iron and steel industries have a positive relationship between 
technology diversity and R&D intensity, while lumber, chemical, and general-purpose machinery have 
negative relations. In summary, the relationship between technology diversity and R&D intensity may 
differ by industry characteristic.  
 
3–4. Technological proximity among industries  
  Each industry and each firm has its own technological position that implies its technology tendencies. 
Industry technology characteristics can be defined by measuring the technological similarity of its 
patenting activities. Based on Jaffe‘s (1986; 1989) theory of technological position closeness, we 
calculated technological proximity among the industries of JSIC concordance.    , the technological 
proximity between industry i and industry j can be defined as follows: 
 
                                                : The number of patent application in industry i of technological field k 
 
Using this term, we calculated the technological closeness among the JSIC industries. Table 3–2 shows 
the technological proximity matrix among the JSIC industries. An underlined numeric value indicates that 
the technological proximity is less than 0.1; meaning that the technologies are very similar between the 
relevant industries. Several groups of close technological relevance (<0.1 proximity) emerged.  
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Table 3–3. Technological proximity between the industries of concordance 
 
Note: Underlined values indicate technological proximity is lower than 0.1
Food 0
beverages & tobacco & feed 0.18 0
Textile 0.26 0.08 0
Lumber & wood 0.46 0.24 0.26 0
Furniture & fixtures 0.58 0.31 0.30 0.19 0
Pulp & paper 0.43 0.21 0.26 0.36 0.45 0
Printing 0.38 0.10 0.19 0.30 0.37 0.21 0
Chemical 0.27 0.17 0.10 0.47 0.59 0.37 0.32 0
Petroleum & coal 0.32 0.12 0.12 0.27 0.36 0.30 0.22 0.24 0
Plastic 0.24 0.06 0.05 0.21 0.32 0.23 0.11 0.09 0.12 0
Rubber 0.38 0.16 0.15 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.24 0.31 0.19 0.15 0
Ceramic & stone & clay 0.38 0.14 0.17 0.24 0.29 0.27 0.15 0.32 0.19 0.13 0.20 0
Iron & steel 0.57 0.33 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.46 0.36 0.57 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.29 0
Non-ferrous metal 0.43 0.16 0.19 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.09 0.39 0.22 0.14 0.20 0.12 0.26 0
Fabricated metal 0.43 0.16 0.21 0.08 0.15 0.28 0.14 0.43 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.13 0.28 0.10 0
General-purpose machinery 0.45 0.17 0.18 0.23 0.14 0.32 0.20 0.44 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.28 0.11 0.12 0
Production machinery 0.57 0.25 0.26 0.34 0.27 0.44 0.31 0.56 0.21 0.30 0.24 0.26 0.40 0.22 0.21 0.13 0
Business oriented machinery 0.61 0.28 0.40 0.49 0.54 0.41 0.11 0.57 0.41 0.30 0.42 0.29 0.52 0.19 0.30 0.34 0.47 0
Electronic parts & circuits 0.55 0.24 0.32 0.39 0.42 0.35 0.07 0.50 0.33 0.22 0.34 0.21 0.43 0.09 0.19 0.25 0.36 0.07 0
Electrical machinery 0.61 0.29 0.36 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.13 0.56 0.35 0.25 0.36 0.24 0.46 0.11 0.18 0.24 0.35 0.19 0.04 0
IC equipment 0.84 0.50 0.60 0.66 0.68 0.59 0.23 0.77 0.58 0.44 0.60 0.44 0.70 0.25 0.36 0.50 0.58 0.27 0.10 0.07 0
Transportation equipment 0.83 0.55 0.46 0.54 0.19 0.69 0.55 0.80 0.58 0.52 0.42 0.48 0.56 0.33 0.38 0.21 0.36 0.72 0.57 0.51 0.80 0
Miscellaneous 0.75 0.50 0.56 0.57 0.64 0.59 0.46 0.75 0.56 0.51 0.56 0.49 0.67 0.46 0.46 0.52 0.63 0.55 0.48 0.51 0.66 0.86 0
Food. Beve. Text. Lumb. Furn. Pulp. Prin. Chem. Petr. Plas. Rubb. Cera. Iron. Non-f. Fabr. Gene. Prod. Busi. Elec.p.Elec.m. ICeq. Tran. Misc.
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As shown in Table 3–3, these 11 technologically closed groups are 1) beverage and textile, 2) beverage 
and plastic, 3) textile and plastic, 4) lumber and fabricated metal, 5) printing and non-ferrous metal, 6) 
printing and electronic parts, 7) chemical and plastic, 8) non-ferrous metal and electronic parts, 9) 
business machinery and electronic parts, 10) electrical parts and electrical machinery, 11) electrical 
machinery and IC equipment. 
  Moreover, the plastic, rubber, ceramic and non-ferrous metal industries have a relatively close 
technological distance with other industries: this is reasonable as these materials form the basis for many 
industries. Furthermore, the electronic parts industry has a close technological relationship with four 
industries. Considering the fundamentals of this industry―making electronic parts―this result is 
reasonable. The food industry, in contrast, shows a relatively large technological distance with the metal 
and machinery industries.  
   
3–5. Technical profiles of concordance 
  Each industry produces its own products; however, their technologies tend to cover many fields. 
Moreover, each industry has its own technological competencies with varying levels of competitive 
advantage (Patel and Pavitt, 1997). To estimate the technology profiles between technology fields and 
industries, we used Patel and Pavitt‘s (1997) technology profiles concept. They defined patent share (PS) 
and revealed technology advantage (RTA), and classified technological competencies into four fields 
(core, background, marginal and niche) by using PS and RTA levels. “It is more useful to think in terms of 
profiles of competencies, with varying levels of commitment and competitive advantage in a range of 
technological fields.” (Patel and Pavitt, 1997, 146pp). We measured PS as shares of industry‘s total 
patents in each of the technology fields, and RTA as a firm‘s shares in total patenting in each of the 23 
technological fields of the JSIC concordance, divided by the firm‘s aggregate share in all the fields. 
Figure 3–1 shows Patel and Pavitt‘s (1997) technological profiles classification. 
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Figure 3–1. A classification for firm‘s technological profiles9 
Patent Share
[PS > 3% ]
II. BACKGROUND                                           I. CORE
[ 2.0 > RTA > 0.5 ]                                                                          [ RTA > 2.0 ]
III. MARGINAL                                              IV. NICHE
[ PS < 3% ]
 
 
                                                        
9
 This figure is cited from Patel and Pavitt (1997), 146pp, Fig. 1.  
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Table 3–4. Firms‘ technological profile according to JSIC concordance 
 
Note: ****: core; ***: niche; **: background; *: marginal. 
 
Technological fields aggregated by JSIC concordance
Food. Beve. Text. Lumb. Furn. Pulp. Prin. Chem. Petr. Plas. Rubb. Cera. Iron. Non-f. Fabr. Gene. Prod. Busi. Elec.p. Elec.m.ICeq. Tran. Misc.
Food **** **** *** *** * *
beverages & tobacco & feed **** **** *** * *** *** * * * *
Textile **** * * **** * * * * * **** * * *
Lumber & wood *** **** *** * * **** * * **** * *
Furniture & fixtures *** **** **** **** * * ***
Pulp & paper * *** * **** **** * * * * * *
Printing * * **** **** * * * **** * * * *
Chemical **** ** **** ** **** ** **** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
Petroleum & coal * *** **** *** * * * * * *** *
Plastic * **** **** **** **** **** * * * **** * * * * *
Rubber * **** **** **** * * * **** *
Ceramic & stone & clay * **** * **** * * **** **** * **** **** * * **** * * * *
Iron & steel **** **** ** * ** **** **** * **** * * *
Non-ferrous metal * * * ** **** **** * * * * * * *
Fabricated metal * **** * **** **** * **** * *** *** * **** * * * *
General-purpose machinery * * * * **** * * * * **** **** *** * * *
Production machinery ** ** ** ** ** ** **** **** **
Business oriented machinery ** ** **** ** **
Electronic parts & circuits ** ** ** ** **** ** **
Electrical machinery **** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **** ** **
IC equipment ** ** ** ** ****
Transportation equipment ** ** ** ** ** ****
Miscellaneous * **** **** * * * * ****
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  Table 3–3 shows the contribution of competencies in each of our technological fields of JSIC 
concordance to 23 JSIC manufacturing industries. By this means, we can estimate the technological 
pattern of each industry‘s patent activity (according to its technological competencies in JSIC 
concordance.) We can directly and easily establish which technology is linked with multiple industries, 
and vice versa. Noteworthy profiles are as follows: 
1) The food, furniture and fixtures, rubber, production machinery, business oriented machinery, 
electronic parts, devices and circuits, information and communication electronics equipment, 
transportation equipment and miscellaneous industries have relatively lower competencies than the 
average. These industries concentrate on their own field of technology to achieve competitive 
advantage. These niche competencies are different to those of Patel and Pavitt (1997), who showed 
agricultural chemicals, bleaching and dyeing, power plant and nuclear energy as niche competencies. 
2) The chemical industry has most background competencies with 11 technology fields. A variety of 
technology fields seem to provide background technological knowledge for the chemical industry. 
Chemical technology has core competencies with four industries, and niche competencies with three 
industries, particularly in the light-manufacturing and material industries. These wide and significant 
competencies are similar to those of Patel and Pavitt (1997). 
3) The ceramic, stone and clay industry has the widest technology competence, and has the most core 
competencies (seven). This industry produces materials for a variety of industries; thus, many 
industries have technological competency with the ceramic, stone and clay industry as they use these 
materials.  
4) Marginal and niche competencies are found mainly in the food, beverage, textile, lumber, furniture, 
and pulp industries. Generally speaking, these industries are niche industries with fewer firms and 
competition.  
5) Plastic technology has the most core technology competencies in lumber, furniture, plastic, rubber, 
ceramic and non-ferrous metal industries. This result indicates that plastic technology is widely used 
in many industry fields. Like the chemical industry, these wide and significant competencies are 
similar to those of Patel and Pavitt (1997). 
6) Plastic, iron and steel, non-ferrous metal, production machinery, and electrical machinery 
technologies are background competencies of the transport industry. These industries make transport 
components such as dash boards, steel, electronic wiring, working robots and electronic parts. To 
produce a complex product such as a car, firms require a variety of technological knowledge relating 
to its components. This relative competencies result differs to Patel and Pavitt (1997)‘s research, 
reflecting the nature of Japanese manufacturing industries. Moreover, Japan‘s automotive industry 
48 
 
competencies are wider and more intensive than Patel and Pavitt‘s (1997) result for the vehicle and 
engines industry. 
 
3–6. Discussion 
This paper constructed a concordance between JSIC and IPC to use patent data at the industrial or firm 
disaggregate level. The concordance of a one-to-one match provides direct and intuitive information that 
includes the relevance and competencies between industrial category and technological fields. Moreover, 
this concordance may be a guideline for researchers using patenting data for analysis at a disaggregated 
level, such as at the firm or industrial level of Japanese manufacturing industries. 
At the firm level analysis, we calculated each firm‘s technological diversity by using JSIC 
Concordance diversity. The Concordance diversity was similar to the IPC concordance based on subclass 
categories. However, considering that Concordance diversity is calculated by industrial category, we 
believe that Concordance diversity may be good proxy index for researchers trying to estimate the 
technological index at an industrial level. Additionally, we found that firm size has a positive relationship 
with technology diversity; moreover, R&D intensity has different relationships by industrial level. These 
results strongly support previous research showing that technology variety has a positive relationship with 
firm size and R&D activity.  
Furthermore, we calculated the technological proximity among the industries. On this basis we 
identified industrial groups at a relatively close distance. Material industries have a relatively close 
technology distance with other industries. Thus, we can consider the technology relevance between 
manufacturing industries.  
We also showed the technological profiles according to the JSIC concordance, by using Patel and 
Pavitt‘s (1997) technological profile theory. This theory highlights the relative competencies between the 
technological fields and industries. We showed that light-industries mainly have marginal and niche 
competencies. Material industries have a variety of technology field competencies. For example, to 
produce cars we showed that the transport equipment industry has technological competencies with 
parts-manufacturing industries. These results represent the actual manufacturing structure of the Japanese 
manufacturing industry. 
This paper has some limitations. Similar to previous research, we focused only on one-to-one JSIC and 
IPC matches. This causes a loss of secondary or tertiary match information. The concordance of multiple 
matches is a matter for future research. For firm level analysis, we did not establish which technological 
diversity index was better − IPC diversity or Concordance diversity. This is a complex issue, because IPC 
diversity is measured by technological sector while Concordance diversity is based on the industry level. 
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However, the relevance and similarities between Concordance diversity and IPC diversity also implies 
that Concordance diversity can be a proxy value for IPC diversity, particularly in manufacturing industrial 
research.  
Using patent data at an industrial level has long been a problem, particularly in the Japanese 
manufacturing industry. By using our JSIC and IPC concordance, researchers can adopt patent data as an 
economic parameter, or use it as a tool to understand technological profile or proximity among the 
industries. We believe this concordance between JSIC and IPC is a valuable tool for the empirical studies 
of Japanese manufacturing industries.  
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3–7. Annex 
Concordance between JSIC and 596 subclass of IPC 
 
 
 
 
 
JSIC IPC JSIC IPC JSIC IPC JSIC IPC JSIC IPC JSIC IPC
9 A21D 13 E05G 16 C07C 19 B60C 24 E04G 26 B21K
9 A22C 14 A41B 16 C07D 19 B68F 24 E05D 26 B21L
9 A23B 14 A61F 16 C07F 19 C08C 24 E06B 26 B23D
9 A23C 14 A62B 16 C07H 19 D07B 24 E06C 26 B23G
9 A23D 14 B31C 16 C07J 19 E01C 24 F23B 26 B23H
9 A23G 14 B41M 16 C07K 19 F16L 24 F23D 26 B23Q
9 A23J 14 C13D 16 C08B 21 A47K 24 F23L 26 B24B
9 A23K 14 D21B 16 C08F 21 B03D 24 F23N 26 B24C
9 A23L 14 D21C 16 C08G 21 B09B 24 F24B 26 B24D
9 C12J 14 D21D 16 C08H 21 B28B 24 F24D 26 B25B
9 C13F 14 D21G 16 C08J 21 B28C 25 B31F 26 B25C
10 A01H 14 D21H 16 C08K 21 C03B 25 B41F 26 B25D
10 A24B 15 B31B 16 C08L 21 C03C 25 B63B 26 B25F
10 A24C 15 B42D 16 C09B 21 C04B 25 B63C 26 B25H
10 A24F 15 B44B 16 C09C 21 C05B 25 B63G 26 B26F
10 B67C 15 B44C 16 C09D 21 E03C 25 B63J 26 B27B
10 C12C 15 B44F 16 C09F 21 E03D 25 C10J 26 B27C
10 C12F 15 B65D 16 C09H 21 E21B 25 C10K 26 B27D
10 C12G 15 D06N 16 C09J 21 F23Q 25 E01D 26 B27F
10 C12H 15 G03H 16 C09K 21 H01T 25 E21D 26 B27G
11 A41C 16 A01M 16 C11B 22 B21B 25 F02C 26 B27L
11 A41D 16 A01N 16 C11C 22 B21C 25 F02K 26 B28D
11 A45B 16 A01P 16 C11D 22 B22D 25 F03D 26 B29C
11 A47G 16 A23F 16 C12N 22 C05D 25 F16T 26 B30B
11 B27N 16 A23P 16 C12P 22 C10B 25 F22B 26 B41K
11 B44D 16 A24D 16 C12S 22 C10C 25 F22D 26 B42B
11 B60V 16 A41G 16 C23F 22 C21B 25 F23C 26 B60B
11 C14B 16 A45D 16 D06L 22 C21C 25 F23G 26 B60F
11 C14C 16 A46B 16 D21J 22 C21D 25 F23H 26 B61B
11 D01B 16 A46D 16 F25J 22 C22C 25 F23J 26 B61J
11 D01F 16 A61K 16 F28G 22 C23C 25 F23M 26 B61K
11 D01G 16 A61P 16 F42B 22 C23G 25 F23R 26 B62B
11 D02G 16 A61Q 16 F42C 22 E02D 25 G21B 26 B65B
11 D02J 16 A62D 16 F42D 22 E04C 25 G21H 26 B65G
11 D03D 16 B01F 16 G03F 22 F16S 26 A01B 26 B66C
11 D04D 16 B01J 17 C09G 22 F17B 26 A01C 26 B66D
11 D04H 16 B29B 17 C10L 22 F27B 26 A01D 26 B67B
11 D06B 16 B32B 18 A42B 22 F27D 26 A01F 26 C02F
11 D06C 16 B41N 18 A44B 23 B22F 26 A01G 26 C10M
11 D06H 16 C01B 18 A45F 23 B23B 26 A21B 26 C23D
11 D06J 16 C01C 18 A63C 23 B23C 26 A21C 26 C25F
11 D06M 16 C01D 18 E01B 23 C05F 26 A23N 26 D02H
11 D06P 16 C01F 18 E01F 23 C22B 26 A41H 26 D03C
11 D06Q 16 C01G 18 E03F 23 C22F 26 B01D 26 D03J
11 D21F 16 C05C 18 E04B 23 C25C 26 B02B 26 D04B
11 F41H 16 C05G 18 E04D 23 C25D 26 B02C 26 E02B
12 B27K 16 C06B 18 E04F 23 C30B 26 B03B 26 E02F
13 A47B 16 C06C 18 F21P 23 E21C 26 B04B 26 F03C
13 A47F 16 C06D 19 A61D 23 H01B 26 B07B 26 F15B
13 B01L 16 C07B 19 B29D 24 A47H 26 B09C 26 F16C
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JSIC IPC JSIC IPC JSIC IPC JSIC IPC JSIC IPC JSIC IPC
26 F16D 28 B81B 29 G11C 30 G09B 31 B60P 31 F16B
26 F16G 28 B81C 29 G21C 30 G09C 31 B60Q 31 F16F
26 F16N 28 F16P 29 G21D 30 G09F 31 B60R 31 F16H
26 F26B 28 G04B 29 G21F 30 G09G 31 B60S 31 F16J
26 F28C 28 G04F 29 G21K 30 G10L 31 B60T 31 F16K
26 F41A 28 G04G 29 H01H 30 G11B 31 B60W 31 F17C
26 F41B 28 G06E 29 H01P 30 H01J 31 B61F 31 F21M
26 F41C 28 H01C 29 H02B 30 H01L 31 B61H 31 F21Q
26 G12B 28 H01F 29 H02H 30 H01Q 31 B62D 31 F21S
26 G21G 28 H01G 29 H02J 30 H01S 31 B62H 31 F28D
27 A01J 28 H01K 29 H02M 30 H03C 31 B62J 31 F28F
27 A61B 28 H03B 29 H05H 30 H03D 31 B62K 31 G01D
27 A61C 28 H03H 30 A47J 30 H03F 31 B62L 31 G01H
27 A61J 29 A61H 30 A47L 30 H03G 31 B62M 31 G01K
27 A61M 29 A61N 30 A61L 30 H03J 31 B63H 31 G01L
27 A63J 29 B07C 30 A62C 30 H03K 31 B64B 31 G01M
27 B26D 29 B08B 30 B03C 30 H03L 31 B64C 31 G05D
27 B27H 29 B26B 30 B04C 30 H03M 31 B64D 31 G05G
27 B31D 29 B27M 30 B06B 30 H04B 31 B64F 31 G08G
27 B41C 29 B60M 30 B21G 30 H04H 31 B65F 31 H01M
27 B41J 29 B61C 30 B82B 30 H04J 31 B66F 31 H01R
27 B41L 29 B61D 30 C40B 30 H04K 31 B68G 31 H02G
27 B42C 29 B61G 30 D01D 30 H04L 31 C13K 31 H02K
27 B65C 29 B61L 30 D06F 30 H04M 31 C25B 31 H02P
27 B65H 29 B64G 30 F01C 30 H04N 31 D01C 32 A01K
27 B67D 29 B66B 30 F16M 30 H04Q 31 D01H 32 A43B
27 C12M 29 C07G 30 F21K 30 H04R 31 D04C 32 A43D
27 C12Q 29 C10G 30 F21L 30 H04S 31 D04G 32 A45C
27 D05B 29 E03B 30 F23K 30 H04W 31 E01H 32 A47D
27 D05C 29 E21F 30 F24C 30 H05B 31 E04H 32 A63B
27 F03G 29 F01D 30 F24F 30 H05K 31 E05B 32 A63D
27 F25B 29 F03B 30 F24H 31 A47C 31 E05C 32 A63F
27 F25C 29 F03H 30 F24J 31 A61G 31 E05F 32 A63G
27 G01B 29 F15D 30 F25D 31 B05B 31 F01B 32 A63H
27 G01G 29 F17D 30 F41J 31 B21D 31 F01K 32 B42F
27 G01N 29 F21V 30 G01C 31 B21F 31 F01L 32 B43K
27 G02B 29 F22G 30 G01F 31 B21H 31 F01M 32 B43L
27 G02C 29 F28B 30 G01P 31 B21J 31 F01N 32 B43M
27 G03B 29 F41F 30 G02F 31 B22C 31 F01P 32 G04C
27 G03C 29 F41G 30 G04D 31 B23F 31 F02B 32 G10B
27 G03D 29 G01J 30 G05F 31 B23K 31 F02D 32 G10C
27 G03G 29 G01R 30 G06F 31 B23P 31 F02F 32 G10D
27 G06T 29 G01S 30 G06G 31 B25J 31 F02G 32 G10F
27 G07G 29 G01T 30 G06K 31 B60D 31 F02M 32 G10G
27 H02N 29 G01V 30 G06M 31 B60G 31 F02N 32 G10H
27 H05F 29 G01W 30 G06N 31 B60H 31 F02P 32 G10K
27 H05G 29 G05B 30 G06Q 31 B60J 31 F04B
28 A44C 29 G07B 30 G07D 31 B60K 31 F04C
28 B05C 29 G07C 30 G07F 31 B60L 31 F04D
28 B05D 29 G08C 30 G08B 31 B60N 31 F04F
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Conclusion 
  This paper examined the relationship between innovation and performance of Japanese manufacturing 
industries. In recent decades, the relationship between a firm‘s innovative activity and performance has 
become a significant issue in corporate economics. However, there is a lack of previous empirical 
analyses, particularly for Japanese manufacturing industries.  
This paper analyzed the innovative activity of the Japanese manufacturing industry in three ways. 
Chapter 1 focused on the firm‘s internal decision strategies relating to diversification. I examined how 
both business diversification and technology diversification affect firm performance in Japan‘s electronic 
equipment industry. Using individual firms‘ financial and patent application data, I completed multiple 
regression models of how diversification strategy affects a firm‘s performance. The empirical results 
show that business concentration and business diversification have negative effects on firm performance: 
this is particularly evident for non-manufacturing diversification. In contrast, technology diversification 
has positive effects on firm performance, showing the importance of technical diversity. 
Technically-diversified firms can enjoy more profit, signifying that a variety of technical fields is a key 
factor for the electronics industry, as it requires a broad range of parts and technologies. 
Chapter 2 examined the firm‘s external methods of innovation, assimilated by firms‘ alliance 
relationships. I believe that the ownership structure of firms is a valuable arrangement to exploit the 
organizational learning effects of technology knowhow. Using data on firms‘ patent applications and 
financial status, I measured multiple regression models of spillover effects to determine whether a 
member‘s technological knowledge is affected by that of other members within the governance 
relationship. I clarified that the technological knowledge of other members has a positive effect on a 
firm‘s technological knowledge. I also proved a hypothesis that a technologically close sector has a 
greater positive effect than technologically distance sector, and that an internal spillover effect is more 
significant than one external to the ownership group. Throughout these results, I clarified the importance 
of technological diffusion inside the ownership structure. This result strongly clarifies the learning effect 
of the ownership structure, thus indicating that the organization is a good measurement of technology 
diffusion. 
Finally, chapter 3 constructed a concordance between JSIC and IPC to exploit patent data as 
disaggregate economic data. One-to-one matched concordance has a limitation in that it loses 
information; however, it provides direct and intuitive information between the industrial category and 
technology fields. This concordance may solve the discordance problem when researchers try to use 
patent data for industrial level analysis. Moreover, I showed several descriptive analyses such as a 
correlation relationship with technological diversity and firm size, technological proximity and 
technological profile. These results represent the actual and beneficial features of manufacturing 
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structures on the Japanese manufacturing industry.  
Throughout this research, I observed how a Japanese manufacturing firm‘s innovation activity affects 
its performance. A firm should undertake a strategy of technology diversification to enhance its 
performance; business diversification did not show to be a useful tool for performance. In relation to a 
firm‘s external strategy, partnership relations such as ownership structure are valuable for technology flow. 
I also showed that technological distance is another important element of the technological spillover 
effect in chapter 2. Finally, I constructed a concordance between JSIC and IPC. By using this, researchers 
can appropriate patent data as economic parameters of the Japanese manufacturing industries. 
I believe that this research can contribute to understanding the behavior of a firm‘s innovation in the 
Japanese manufacturing industries.  
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